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ASSESSING PAST STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, IN
LEBANON AND BY LIBYA

Louis Kriesherg

Abstract

American strategies to deal with terrorist attacks against Americans in Lebanon in
the 1980s and by Libya since the beginning of the 1980s are examined. The
consequences of the various strategies employed by U.S. government officials over
time and the strategies employed by American non-governmental actors and by
international organizations are compared. In addition, alternative strategies that
might plausibly have been employed are also discussed. Official actions that relied
largely on military methods and were conducted unilaterally tended to be less
effective, even counterproductive, compared to actions that were multilateral and
relied significantly on diplomatic approaches, often aided by intermediaries.

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has been used by many U.S.
government officials to designate responses to the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Useful as that term was in mobilizing American support for the policies the
government chose, the designation has been widely criticized as indicating an
inadequate and misleading analysis of the event and its causes, and therefore to an
inappropriate and ultimately failing strategy (Hoffman 2003; Lehman 2002,
September 16). Those criticisms are generally deserved, if unacknowledged.
Terrorism as the enemy is too vague and broad a target and it steers attention away
from the specific organizations using many methods to achieve various objectives in
opposition to the United States. To wage a war justifies undue military methods
when the conflict necessarily requires applying a wide variety of methods of
struggle. Five years after the attack, officials began to shift the designation of the
conflict to the "long war;" but that does not adequately meet the criticisms (Safire
2006).
After briefly discussing terrorism as a method of waging a conflict, I
discuss a broad conflict resolution approach that helps to analyze the recourse to
terrorism and contributes to formulating constructive strategies to counter terrorist
actions. In the second half of this article, two cases of American responses to
terrorist attacks, one relating to Lebanon and the other to Libya are analyzed. This
analysis compares the consequences of different American strategies in countering
terrorism in those cases and also discusses the possible effectiveness of constructive
strategies that were not employed.
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Various American strategies were pursued, in the 1980s and afterwards, to
deal with the terrorist blows in Lebanon and those occurring at the behest of the
Libyan government. The long-run consequences of the attacks and of American
responses have differed. This analysis will not only help assess different ways of
countering terrorism, but should also contribute to understanding the reasons for the
decisions would-be terrorists make and the decisions that those who counter them
make presently. After all, American officials and perpetrators of terrorism both
learn from past experience, inferring mistaken as well as correct lessons.
Terrorism

There is no consensus about the meaning of the word terrorism; even the
governments constituting the UN cannot agree, and militant nongovernmental
organizations add further dissenting views. The disagreements reflect the reality
that "terrorism" is pejorative, generally used to condemn particular violent actions
taken by enemies. Such usage provides information about the user, but is not
suitable for analytic or policy purposes. For such purposes, it is best to understand
the many defining features of terrorist actions that various contending groups
employ; they differ in terms of the actions' form, target, perpetrator, and context.
Violent acts or threats of violence generally are intended to frighten others
and to compel compliance. One feature that may be used to designate an action as
terrorist is its frightening manner, such as killing people cruelly and desecrating the
body. For example, when the Ku Klux Klan acted to restore white domination of
African Americans in the U.S. South after the Civil War, its members publicly
lynched African Americans, leaving mutilated bodies hanging from trees.
Some government officials act to terrorize those who might resist their rule;
they arrest and imprison, torture, and assassinate presumed opponents. These
government actions are often conducted covertly and sometimes by nonofficial
militia groups. Such operations are generally regarded as "state terrorism," as
carried out in the assassinations and disappearances of citizens in Argentina,
Guatemala, and Chile. State terrorism also includes the massive killings, labor-camp
incarcerations, and torture by "internal security" forces of Hitlerite Germany and of
Stalinist Soviet Union.
Another feature often used to define terrorist actions is targeting
noncombatants for violent acts. But intentions and definitions of noncombatants are
often disputed. Soldiers conducting military actions, such as shelling, bombing,
setting booby traps, or planting landmines that are directed against combatants do
not regard themselves to be committing terrorist acts even if many noncombatants
are the victims. The injured persons, however, often disagree, and blanket bombings
of cities during the Second World War, the use of weapons of mass destruction are
widely regarded as terrorist, even if the perpetrators justify it as regrettable, but
necessary to save lives.
Perpetrators of targeted killing of noncombatants sometimes justify their
conduct by arguing that they are merely reciprocating such atrocities committed by
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the enemy or that the so called noncombatants are actually fighters. For example,
immediately after the 9/11 attacks, a senior al Qaeda operative who helped plan the
attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, defended them by denying that they were terrorist
attacks:
... they are legally legitimate, because they are committed against a country
at war with us, and the people in that country are combatants. Someone
might say that it is the innocent, the elderly, the women, and the children
who are victims, so how can these operations be legitimate according to
sharia? And we say that the sanctity of women, children, and the elderly is
not absolute. There are special cases ... Muslims may respond in kind if
infidels have targeted women and children and elderly Muslims [or if] they
are being invaded [or if] the non-combatants are helping with the fight,
whether in action, word, or any other type of assistance, [or if they] need to
attack with heavy weapons, which do not differentiate between combatants
and non-combatants (Cullison 2004, p. 68).
Another standard used to distinguish terrorist from non-terrorist violence is
the nature of the perpetrator. A defining feature of a state is that it holds a monopoly
on legitimate violence. It follows that when agents of the state commit violence
under orders from above, they are engaging in warfare or police action, which
cannot be classified as terrorism. Governments usually declare that when agents of
a nongovernmental actor, domestic or foreign, commits violence against officials of
the state, they are committing a crime and a terrorist act. Thus, when the USS Cole
was attacked in the harbor at Aden, Yemen, in October 2000, and seventeen U.S.
Navy sailors were killed, the U.S. government and public regarded the action as a
terrorist attack (Clarke 2004). This characterization of the attack was made because
the Al-Qaeda network was responsible, and it is not a government.
Finally, the context of the violent actions also affects whether or not many
people regard the actions as terrorist. An important aspect of the context is the
transparency shown by the persons committing the action. If the perpetrators act
openly, they are publicly claiming legitimacy and more evidently trying to advance
political goals. However, some agents committing violent actions do so covertly,
which makes it difficult to understand the perpetrators goals and how the conflict
might be settled. Furthermore, persons engaging in covert operations generally are
able to act with little accountability and little regard for "humanity."
Another aspect of context is the degree to which the violence is part of a
wide array of other methods of struggle. A violent act may be incidental in a largescale struggle in which various nonviolent methods are also being used, such as
ideological, religious, or political appeals and mobilization. In such cases the violent
actions are less likely to be regarded as terrorist, while if violence is the primary
method of conducting a conflict, they are more readily labeled terrorist.
An additional aspect of the context is the extent to which the violent actions
are carried out with the ultimate purpose of negotiating an agreement with the
adversary. Violent actions may even be used to gain the attention of the inattentive.
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A cause is being announced, and indeed, an audience is gained as people try to
understand why such actions are taken.
In short, violent actions vary immensely and there is no consensus about
which features should be used to define terrorist acts. Since the focus of this article
is on attacks against the United States and American responses, the official U.S.
definition of terrorism should be recognized. The definition is contained in Title 22
of the U.S. code, Section 2656f(d):
The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups or clandestine
agents,
usually
intended
to
influence
an
audience
(http://www.cia.gov/terrorism/faqs.html).
The many other characteristics that various entities use to designate certain acts
as terrorist should also be recognized. In this article, the terms used by the
adversaries in conflicts will be used, but other analytic concepts will also be
considered.
In examining how to counter U.S. government defined acts of terrorism, it
will be useful to consider strategies that may isolate the perpetrators, mobilize
international support against them, and thus construct American policies that are
likely to be fruitful. For example, an approach that locates violent actions, regarded
as terrorist, within a human rights framework might help accomplish those results.
That context could be the basis for criminalizing terrorist actions. It would
emphasize more reliance on police actions than on waging wars. That also is likely
to result in more precise and accurate identification of perpetrators, and win greater
international consensus for their arrest and trial. Such framing also has the benefit
of constraining a government's attempts to counter terrorism by committing its own
human rights violations, which often are counterproductive. These considerations
are more consistent with reliance on constructive ways of conducting conflicts,
which is discussed next.
Conflict Resolution Approaches

This analysis draws concepts and propositions from the field of conflict
resolution, broadly conceived, which are applicable to large-scale conflicts at each
stage in the course of a conflict (Kriesberg 2003). The ideas help explain how
constructive ways of waging a conflict are sometimes taken at various conflict
stages: how the emergence of destructive conflicts are averted, how destructive
escalations are limited, interrupted, or stopped, how destructive conflicts become
transformed and mutual accommodations are reached, and how agreements and
accommodations are made and sustained. The conflict resolution ideas also help
explain how possible constructive ways of fighting often are not adopted, with
mutually destructive consequences. I will suggest how such alternative strategies
may be relevant for conflicts in which terrorist attacks occur and counter efforts are
undertaken.
Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 1
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Seven basic and inter-related ideas in the conflict resolution field are
relevant for constructively countering terrorist acts. First, conflicts are recognized
to be inevitable in social life and often serve to advance and to sustain important
human values, including security, freedom, and economic well-being.
Unfortunately, however, conflicts often are conducted in ways that damage those
values; thus, fighting for security can generate insecurities not only for an
adversary, but also for the party fighting to win and protect its own.
Second, in the conflict resolution field, a conflict is regarded as a kind of
social interaction in which what each side affects the other. Therefore each side is
able to affect its opponent by its own conduct; it can strengthen its position in
various ways, besides trying to destroy or harm the antagonist. In conventional
behavior, adversaries in a conflict each tend to blame the opponent for the bad
things that happen in a fight, and they even tend to regard their own bad conduct as
forced upon them by the opponent. That is, each side tends to see itself as the
victim; but such self-victimization actually reduces the possible forms of resisting
and countering the antagonists' attacks.
Third, all humans have basic needs and the denial of those needs is an
important source of conflicts while recognizing and satisfying them at some level
are critical to resolving a conflict (Burton 1990; Laue and Corrnick 1978).
However, the cultural variability in considering needs and how these are defined is
very great (Avruch 1998). Thus, all humans may wish to be respected and not
humiliated; just how important that wish is and how it is defined and manifested
varies widely among cultures and subcultures. One way to bridge these differences
is to draw on those components that have a wide consensus affirmed by
international declarations and conventions about basic human rights (Babbitt
Forthcoming).
Fourth, members of each party in a conflict have a collective identity, and
they attribute an identity to the adversary. The identities seem to be immutable, but
of course they actually change, in part as the parties interact with each other, and try
to define each other. Moreover, every person has numerous identities associated
with membership in many collectivities, such as a country, a religious community,
an ethnicity, and an occupation. (Anderson 1991; Wilmer 2002). No large entity is
unitary and homogeneous; the members of every large-scale entity differ in
hierarchical ranks and in ways of thinking, and tend to have different degrees of
commitment for the struggles in which their collectivity is engaged.
Fifth, a related insight is that no conflict is wholly isolated; rather each is
linked to many others. Each adversary has various internal conflicts that impinge on
its external adversaries, and each has a set of external conflicts, some linked over
time and others subordinated to even larger conflicts. Changes in the salience of
one conflict impacts the salience other related conflicts. Leaders of one adversary
group may give undue attention to their relations with their constituency, to the
detriment of giving appropriate attention to an external conflict.
Sixth, workers in the CR field generally define conflict in terms of persons
or groups who manifest incompatible goals (Pruitt 1986; Wehr 1979). That
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manifestation, moreover, is not solely violent; rather, each contending party also
may use elements of nonviolent coercion, promised benefits, and persuasive
arguments to achieve its contested goals. Conflicts are waged using a changing
blend of coercive and non-coercive inducements, and issues are settled by
negotiations, sometimes even when terrorist actions are involved (Murray 1990).
Analysts and practitioners of CR often note that great reliance on violence and
coercion is risky and can be counterproductive (Johnson 2000).
Finally, adversaries wage a conflict against each other within a larger social
context. Some of the people and groups not engaged as partisans in the conflict may
be drawn in as supporters or allies of one side; that possibility can influence the
partisans on each side to act so as not to move the outsiders to help their opponent.
CR workers generally stress the direct and indirect roles that outsiders exercise in
channeling the course of conflicts, particularly as interveners who mediate and
otherwise seek to mitigate and resolve conflicts (Ury 2000).
These considerations indicate the importance of carefully analyzing a
conflict to improve the chances that the policies chosen by partisans or by
intermediaries will be effective and not turn out to be counterproductive. The
analysis should include gathering information about the various stakeholders in the
conflict, regarding their interests and their views of each other. That knowledge
should be coupled with theoretical understanding of conflicts generally, based on
experience and research. The theoretical understanding can suggest a wide range of
possible options for action and indicate the probabilities of different outcomes for
various options. Such an analysis can help avoid policies that seem attractive for
internal considerations, but unsuitable for contending with the external adversary.
In the following discussion of violent attacks related to Lebanon and Libya in the
1980s and 1990s, American responses to terrorist challenges will be reviewed and
alternative policies considered.
Lebanon

Suicide bombers killed hundreds of Americans and many Americans were
taken hostage in Lebanon during the 1980s. Those attacks and American responses
to them cannot be understood without taking into account the context in which they
occurred. Lebanon was the site of intense fighting among various Christian and
Islamic militia groups during the 1970s and 1980s (Azar 1983).
The severe
differences worsened when the PLO and many Palestinians came to southern
Lebanon to continue their struggle against Israel; this followed the Jordanian
government's forcible expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970. Some of the
militia had significant support from Syria and from Iran, which was ruled by
revolutionary-minded Shi'a clerics who took power in1979.
American policies. President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981,
and viewed the issues in the Middle East, as in the rest of the world, in terms of the
ongoing U.S.-Soviet rivalry (Quandt 1992). He tended to believe that disturbances
in the Middle East were instigated by the Soviets and the U.S. must forge local
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strategic relationships, notably with Israel. In early 1982, Israeli officials visited
Washington to discuss an ambitious plan: to crush the PLO in Lebanon and help
place a friendly Christian militia leader of the Phalangist party, Bashir Gemayal in
the president's office. They believed, as did many in the region, that Secretary of
State Alexander M. Haig Jr. gave a "green light." to the plan.
On June 6, 1982 Israeli military forces entered southern Lebanon and
moved up to besiege Beirut, to which Arafat and the PLO had retreated. As the
military operations escalated and encountered Syrian forces, many associates of
President Reagan, but not Haig, sought to stop the fighting (Quandt 1992). George
P. Schultz replaced Haig as Secretary of State in July and in August the United
States helped arrange the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut to Tunisia. The U.S.
marines joined French and Italian soldiers forming an international force to oversee
the departure, and also to provide security for the Palestinian civilians staying
behind. The PLO departure was completed by September 1, 1982, and the
international force was withdrawn by September 10, 1982.
Upon becoming Secretary of State, Shultz persuaded Reagan try to advance
peace between Israel and the Palestinians. On September 1, 1982 Reagan proposed
a plan that would entail some form of association between the West Bank, Gaza,
and Jordan and a withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories, to an extent
influenced by the agreed- upon security arrangements. The Israeli government
expressed its disagreement but the response from the Arab governments was not as
opposed.
Progress on this initiative might have placed American engagement in the
region in a favorable context. However, violent events in Lebanon quickly
undermined possible progress. On September 14, 1982, pro-Syrian elements
assassinated Bashir Gemayel, who had been elected President on August 23
(Quandt 1992). Then on September 16th some members of a Phalangist militia
entered Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps, which were surrounded by
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and massacred hundreds of people living there.
Following the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the international force returned to Beirut.
On April 18, 1983, a suicide truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut
killed 63 persons, including 17 Americans. Reagan administration officials believed
that Hizbollah was responsible for the attack (Hajjar 2002). Hizbollah is a non-state
actor whose members are Shi'a Lebanese; Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah,
influenced by Iranian clerics, provided spiritual leadership. The U.S. government
made no immediate response; but intelligence was gathered in preparation for
possible retaliation.
Climaxing this growing violence came the October 23, 1983 suicide truck
bombing that devastated a Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 marines. President
Ronald Reagan, in response, ordered the battleship USS New Jersey to shell the hills
above Beirut; this may have demonstrated strength and resolve to the American
public, but it gained only more antagonism from living there. Hizbollah again was
regarded as responsible for the destruction of the Marine barracks, and the U.S.
developed a plan to bomb the barracks of Iranian Revolutionary guards in Lebanon
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(http://ww.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.htmil). But the plan
was aborted, presumably due to concerns about harming U.S.-Arab relations. In
four months, President Regan ordered the U.S. marines to begin withdrawing from
Lebanon.
A December 12, 1983 suicide truck bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait
was followed by other terrorist acts in Lebanon. The U.S. government did not
retaliate, but the Kuwaiti authorities quickly arrested, convicted and imprisoned 17
persons believed to be members of Al Dawa, an Iranian-backed Lebanese Shi'a
group, which was the forerunner of Hizbollah. Foreign nationals were taken
hostage in Lebanon in order to win the release of the "Al Dawa 17."
On March 16, 1984 CIA Beirut station chief William Buckley was
kidnapped, he was tortured and his body was not found until 1991. On September
20, 1984, a truck bombing of the U.S. embassy annex near Bierut killed 24 people,
including two U .S. military personnel. Again no direct retaliation was undertaken,
but the CIA began training Lebanese and other foreign intelligence agents to strike
at presumed terrorists (Wright 1986). On March 8, 1985, a truck bomb exploded
the apartment building in Beirut where Sheik Fadlallah lived; over 80 people were
killed, but not Fadlallah, who was not at home. The militant Shia blamed the CIA,
which denied responsibility for the disastrous operation.
As a consequence of the numerous attacks and the lack of an effective
counter strategy, the U.S . government basically ceased any official activities in
Lebanon. Syrian control was solidified.
The presence and the work of the American University of Beirut (AUB)
constitutes another way in which Americans were engaged in Lebanon. The AUB
was founded in 1866 as a private, independent, non-sectarian institution of higher
learning, chartered in the State of New York. It has been a preeminent university in
the region, with many distinguished alumni. However, in the volatile Beirut of the
1980s it could not wall off the sectarianism, threats, and terror outside its buildings
(Sutherland 1996). In July 1982, David Dodge, a past President of AUB was taken
hostage, the first of many hostages taken in Lebanon in the 1980s. Then, on January
18, 1984, Malcom Kerr, President of AUB, was assassinated in the hall outside his
office.
Overall, in the 1980s, 15 Americans were taken hostage, as well as 39
British, French German, and other foreign nationals; 6 were known have been
killed. Most hostages were released, but many only after years of captivity.
The U.S. government, still avoiding coming to grips with the political and
social problems of the region, launched the Iran-Contra operation. This operation
was an elaborate, but misguided and illegal (according to U.S. laws) attempt to free
the captives in Lebanon, and to raise funds for the Contras fighting in Nicaragua. In
1985 and 1986, a series of transactions were undertaken in which American arms
were sold to Iran, through Israel and then private intermediaries, to induce the
Iranian government to influence Lebanese Shi' a groups to release the hostages they
were holding, and three hostages were released in the course of the arms-for-
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hostages dealings. This operation occurred during the 1980-1988 war between Iran
and Iraq, in which the U.S. government "tilted" in favor of Iraq. Furthermore, the
profits generated by the sales were diverted to provide arms to the Contras who
were fighting to overthrow the Sandinista-led government of Nicaragua. When this
bizarre scheme was exposed, it was quickly halted; Congressional investigations
followed, and then criminal indictments of U.S. National Security Advisor John
Poindexter and his aide, Colonel Oliver North.
When George H. W. Bush took office as president of the United States on
January 20, 1989, he said, "There are today Americans who are held against their
will in foreign lands, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be
shown here and will be long remembered. Goodwill begets goodwill." (Picco 1999).
That last sentence initiated and provided the basis for a UN diplomatic operation to
free the remaining hostages in Beirut. In particular, Giandomenico Picco, assistant
secretary-general to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar conducted
intensive mediation, shuttling from one country to another in the region.
The mediation had considerable success, aided by several changes in the
region. When the Iraqis invaded and seized control of Kuwait in 1990, its military
forces unwittingly released the imprisoned Al Dawa 17 ending the demand for their
release. More generally, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989 enabled
more pragmatic Iranian clerics to try playing a larger leadership role and it loosened
Iranian influence over Hizbollah and its spiritual leader, Sheik Fadlallah.
But it was the perseverance, courage, and extraordinary skills of Pico as
well as his role as the representative of the UN Secretary-General that greatly
contributed to the successes of the mediation. The operation exemplifies many of
the contributions that mediation can provide to settle a conflict, as discussed in
Chapter two. Pico was able to meet with representatives of parties who would not
communicate directly with each other and who had profound mistrust of each other.
The release of the hostages was part of a complex set of actions by the UN
Secretary General, also the Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Israeli, American, British,
and German authorities, Hizbollah, and the groups actually holding the hostages.
Each gave what other parties sought. These were not disreputable bargains; rather,
each side acted honorably, doing the right thing. With the notable exception of
Israel, each received significant benefits that they sought.
Hizbollah and the hostage holders won the release of many Lebanese
detainees held by the Israelis. The UN Secretary-General issued a statement based
on an analysis of the outbreak of the Iraq-Iranian war, that Iraq initiated it. The
citizens taken hostage in Lebanon, citizens of United States, Germany and other
countries, were freed. The sequencing of bits of information about the conditions of
the detained, of the assurances about their releases and future relations, and of the
individuals released was extremely difficult to agree upon and implement. It
required a demanding and risky engagement by the UN mediator.
The
achievements might have been the basis for further ones, but the international
convergence of interests and commitments had weakened, and the "goodwill begets
goodwill" approach was shelved (Picco 1999).
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In short, the official American policies to counter terrorism against
Americans in Lebanon ranged greatly during the 1980s and 1990s, and the results
were mixed. The severe attacks in the early 1980s were in part attributable to over
ambitious official goals in attempting to reshape Lebanon's political system. The
U.S. became engaged as one of the party's in the civil wars, but did not do so
openly or with official American commitments. When the costs in American lives
rose and with no easy solution visible, the American military forces and other
American personnel were withdrawn. Perhaps surprisingly, American public
recriminations of this failed policy were muted. Yet, Hizbollah and other Islamic
and nationalist militant groups in the region could reasonably believe that non-state
violence had driven the United States out of Lebanon, and that suicide bombing was
an effective tool. Furthermore, Hizbollah could interpret U.S. official conduct in
Lebanon as confirming its analysis of American imperialist and anti-Islamic goals.
Some non-official American activities fared better. The AUB continued to
function as an American university throughout the civil wars. It was under
great duress, but it survived and remained a representative of American
engagement and again manifests the value of non-sectarianism and
independence on the part of non-governmental organizations.
Alternatives. Initially, the U.S. should have more consistently avoided large
interventionist goals, and not tried so actively to shape internal Lebanese affairs.
The attempot to work with Israel to establish an allied govemmnet in Lebanon was
overreaching and likely to be counter proctive, even if initially successful. Popular
Lebanese movements, with powerful regional allies could not be easily overcome.
Perhaps, more cautious work with the more moderate Islamic groups and avoiding
reliance on the more extreme Christian Phalange might have had some success, but
under the circumstances in the 1980s in the region, even that was unlikely.
Given the highly ambitious U.S. goals and the American government's
unwillingness to invest the resources that might, however improbably, attain them,
withdrawal probably was the best policy. After all, Israel had much more at stake
and stayed much longer in southern Lebanon, but it too finally withdrew unilaterally
from Lebanon in 2000. The reasons for the American withdrawal, however, should
have been more honestly discussed by the president and the public. Denials and
distractions would not serve America well in the long run.
Ultimately, Lebanon and even Hizbollah began to change, in conjunction
with changes inside Iran and Lebanon, and the Israeli withdrawal from south
Lebanon. Increasingly, Hizbollah was becoming a part of the social and political
life of Lebanon. Although still on the Department of State's list of terrorist
organizations, George W. Bush's administration began to recognize its evolving
role in Lebanon, exemplified by Condoleezza Rice's urging that it cleanse itself of
"its terrorist wing" (Hajjar 2002)
American cooperation with the UN to win the release of the hostages was
quite successful, and prompted by Bush's inaugural speech observation, "Goodwill
begets goodwill." But the story is uncelebrated. Newspaper accounts of how the
hostages were freed were scanty. Even Secretary of State Baker in his memoirs
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does not mention Pico's mediation or even the freeing of the hostages. Celebrating
or at least acknowledging such successes would help build support for constructive
conflict resolution approaches.
Libya
On September 1, 1969, Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi led a military coup that
overthrew the constitutional monarchy governing Libya; the coup leaders, the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), took control of the government. Qaddafi
proclaimed an ideology blending his personal socialist philosophy, Arab
nationalism, and Islamic traditions, while denigrating Wes tern capitalism and Soviet
Communism (St. John 2002). The RCC quickly moved to implement its nationalist
program. The large American air base in Libya was closed; similarly, the British
troops stationed in Libya soon withdrew. Furthermore, Qaddafi negotiated new
terms with the foreign oil companies operating in Libya, beginning with Occidental
Petroleum. Under the new terms, the Libyan government could control production
and set prices; the oil companies therefore turned to make their profits in the
distribution and processing of petroleum. The governments of the other major
petroleum exporting countries followed a similar course. The RCC, however, went
further and in 1973 nationalized the oil companies operating in Libya.
Libyan oil revenues soared in the 1970s's, as they did in other petroleumrich countries. The Libyan government used the influx of money to build up the
Libyan social and economic infrastructure. Indeed, education and medical care
became more widely available and housing and transportation were greatly
improved (Vandewalle 1998).
Qaddafi also used some of the increased funds to begin giving financial and
other support to many organizations he regarded as revolutionary or waging
national liberation struggles, and which the U.S. government saw as engaging in
terrorist violence. In the late 1960s and 1970s, many political leaders and public
intellectuals, romanticized the use of violence as a tool of national liberation
(Conversi 1993; Debray 1967). Qaddafi strongly identified with and lent support to
the Palestinian cause and the organizations engaged in the struggle against Israel.
His support of revolutionary movements in many parts of the world was one way to
advance his grandiose ambitions to be a major player on the world stage. It also led
to cooperation with the Soviet Union, despite his anti-communist beliefs. However,
government leaders of Arab countries and of many other countries of the world
came to regard Qaddafi as bizarre, untrustworthy, and sometimes dangerous
(Hudson 1977).
American policies. Official American policy was not initially hostile to the
new Libyan regime. President Nixon and his administration initially regarded
Qaddafi as a nationalist and anti-Communist, and eschewed hostile actions, which
were likely to be counterproductive (St. John 2002).
However, this began to
change in the mid-1970s. Several Libyan actions troubled the U.S. government,
such as concluding a major arms deal with the Soviets in 1974 and increasingly
allying itself with the Soviet Union. By 1976, the administration of President
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Gerald Ford was publicly suggesting that Libya was supporting international
terrorism. Economic relations, nevertheless, continued to grow and the United
States was the largest purchaser of Libyan oil, between 1977 and 1980.
Qaddafi initially welcomed President Jimmy Carter's administration,
believing it heralded a change in U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
However, he was soon disappointed by what he regarded as too little change.
Furthermore, the Carter administration sided with Egypt in its July 1977 skirmishes
with Libya and the administration blocked the sale of transport planes to Libya,
accusing it of terrorism. Then in late 1977 the U.S. discovered evidence that Libya
was sponsoring an attempt to assassinate Herman Frederick Eilts, U.S. ambassador
to Egypt (1974-79). Carter, in a personal note, informed Qaddafi that he knew of
the plot; Qaddafi denied its existence, and the plan was stillborn. Among many
other issues of great contention, in December 1979 a crowd of two thousand
Libyans sacked and burned the U.S. embassy in Tripoli (Davis 1990, 37).
As American-Libyan relations were deteriorating, Qaddafi pursued a
campaign in 1978-1979 of people-to-people dialogue, in keeping with his ideology
stressing direct popular participation (St. John 2002, 110-111).
The campaign
included promoting goodwill tours, creating friendship societies, and contacts with
organizations representing African-Americans, . Black Muslims, and Arab
Americans. Billy Carter, President Carter's brother, became embroiled in this
Libyan campaign in a way that provided grounds to attack and embarrass the
President. Billy Carter visited Libya as part of a delegation of Georgian farmers
and businesspersons in 1978 and he returned in 1979. In 1980 it became known that
he had received $220,000 from the Libyan government, as part of a loan, and he
registered as an agent of a foreign country (Carter 1982, 546-550). The Libyan
people-to-people diplomacy and related efforts had little effect on improving
Libyan-American relations, being accompanied by too many other antagonistic
interactions.
Ronald Reagan took office as president on January 20, 1981, determined to
wage an aggressive policy against the Soviet Union and international terrorism
directed at the United States. He chose Bill Casey to serve as Director of the CIA,
who was eager to energize the Agency and he enthusiastically spurred it to wage a
covert war against Communism. Casey's first covert action was to support Chad's
military resistance against Libya's forces in Chad (Woodward 1987, 93-97). This
was part of a plan developed by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and
Casey to discretely "bloody Qaddafi's nose."
A series of overt and covert hostile acts were exchanged throughout the
years of Reagan's two administrations. American officials denounced Libya's
support of international terrorism and a policy of assassinating Libyan dissidents
living in several countries. In May 1981 the U.S. closed the Libyan People's bureau
in Washington.
In August 1981, the U.S. Navy challenged Libya's extension of maritime
claims to cover the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean Sea and shot down two
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Libyan attack planes (St. John 2002).i In March 1982, the U.S. government placed
an embargo on Libyan oil and restricted exports to Libya. During this period, the
Libyan government was actually becoming more vulnerable to American pressure
and less capable of pursuing aggressive and hostile policies. The Libyan
government's revenues and resources declined because the price of oil had gone
down and the radical Libyan economic policies discouraged American and other
foreign investors.
Nevertheless, Qaddafi did retaliate for U.S. actions in the Gulf of Sidra.
During 1985, an extremist Palestinian group headed by Abu Nidal, which the
Reagan administration believed Libya aided, carried out several terrorist attacks.
These attacks including seizing an Italian cruise ship the Achille Lauro and
murdering an elderly American passenger in a wheelchair; and also killing many
civilians at the El Al (an Israeli airline) counters in Rome's and in Vienna's airports
(St. John 2002, 131-132). In January 1986, the U.S. government froze Libyan
assets in the United States and ended all economic activities in Libya. Reagan
considered but withheld military retaliation due to disagreement within the
administration about its advisability. Secretary of Defense Weinberger in particular
cast doubts that a military action at the time would discourage future terrorist
attacks (St. John 2002; Woodward 1987). Covert actions, however, were increased.
Then, on April 5, 1986 a Berlin nightclub received a Libyan bomb attack
that killed two U.S. soldiers and injured 79 servicemen. The U.S. government
retaliated on April 14, 1986, with air attacks on targets around Benghazi and
Tripoli, including the military barracks where Qaddafi resided. Qaddafi survived,
but his two-year old adopted daughter was killed. A climactic retaliatory escalation
by Qaddafi followed two years later.
On December 21, 1988, a bomb secreted in stowed luggage destroyed Pan
Am Flight 103 and killed the 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground in
Lockerbie, Scotland where the plane crashed. Identifying who had placed the bomb
in the airplane required the cooperation of 70 law enforcement agencies in intensive
scientific and traditional police work in four continents. American suspicion at first
was directed at Iran because six months before the Lockerbie disaster, the USS
Vincennes, an American warship patrolling in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq
war, mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger airplane, killing 290 Islamic
pilgrims on their way to Mecca. It was widely suspected that the Iranian
government had ordered the attack on the Pan Am 103, with the aid of Syria and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(http://www.bbc.eo.uk/print/crime/casec1osed/lockerbie l .shtml).
After almost two years of investigations, the evidence implicated two
agents of the Libyan government, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin
Khalifa Fhimah. In November 1991 the U.S. and British governments charged the
agents with the Pan Am 103 bombing and asked for their extradition. In October
1991, a French magistrate had issued arrest warrants for the Libyan agents charged
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with the 1989 bombing of a French airliner, UTA 772. The American, British, and
French governments now joined together to obtain a UN Security Council
Resolution calling on Libya to remand the named individuals for trial in the
countries in which they had been indicted. UN Security Council Resolution 731
was passed in January 1992, calling for Libyan cooperation with investigations of
the bombings.
In February, Qaddafi tried to avoid sanctions by turning over the UTA
suspects to a French court and the Lockerbie suspects to an international tribunal.
The U.S. and British governments insisted that the Lockerbie suspects be turned
over to U.S. or British courts. Qadaffi's next offer, to hand over the suspects to the
Arab League, was also rejected by the American and British governments, and then
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 748, on March 31, 1992 (Cortright
2000). It imposed limited sanctions, including embargoes on air travel and of sales
of aircraft and of arms.
Under continuing pressure from the families of the victims of Pan Am 103's
destruction, the administration of President Bill Clinton pressed for progress in
bringing the perpetrators of the bombing to justice (Albright 2003). Resolution 883,
adopted on November 11, 1993 by the UN Security Council, imposed additional
sanctions that tightened aviation sanctions, froze Libyan government assets, and
banned some oil-transporting equipment.
Nelson Mandela made a critical mediating contributions that helped the
negotiations to progress and the sanctions against Libya to be lifted (Boyd-Judson
2005 March). In October 1997, Mandela, President of South Africa, went to Libya
and presented Qaddafi the South African Medal of Good Hope and expressed
gratitude for the Libyan support for the South African liberation struggle. In visits
to Washington, London, and Tripoli, he conveyed the views and moral perspectives
of Qadaffi to American and British officials and theirs to him, communicating his
own recognition of each side's sense of morality regarding the Lockerbie case. This
helped create a moral space for Qaddafi to negotiate and enabled Mandela to
harshly urge Qaddifi to speak respectfully of the United Nations, as well as to work
for all sides' compliance to the agreements that were reached. Mandela's stature,
moral authority, and independence were resources that he strategically employed.
Qadaffi tried to act more respectably, pulling back from supporting
terrorism and improving his relations with Arab and African governments. This
weakened the chances of renewing Resolution 883, which required review every
four months. In 1998, the US government came up with a new option, picking up
on Qadaffi's prior offer to tum the suspects over for trial in a neutral country: the
trial would be held in the Netherlands before a Scottish judge and under Scottish
law. After more negotiations, in March 1999 Qadaffi agreed to yield the two
suspects and UN sanctions would be suspended (but not lifted). The trial was held
and on January 31, 2001, the defendant Megrahi was found guilty of murder and
sentenced to prison for life, while his co-defendant was not found guilty and was
freed.
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Libya took further steps to permanently end sanctions and restore normal
relations with the United States. In 2003, Libya reached an agreement regarding
compensation with the Pan Am families and accepted responsibility for its officials'
actions; with that, the UN sanctions were removed. Finally, negotiations yielded an
agreement for both the ending of U.S . economic sanctions and the verifiable
dismantling of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
With that, American-Libyan relations completed their transformation and their
economic ties were renewed.
Flynt Leverett, senior director for Middle Eastern affairs at the National
Security Council from 2002 to 2003 writes, this quid pro quo demonstrates that "to
persuade a rogue regime to get out of the terrorism business and give up its weapons
of mass destruction, we must not only apply pressure but also make clear the
potential benefits of cooperation."(Leverett 2004; Tyler 2003)
Accounts for this transformation are controversial because different parties
defend or criticize past policies and use their explanation to argue about future
policies (Jentleson 2005). I present an interpretation that I regard as well supported
by the evidence. The initial American unilateral economic sanctions may have had
little effect. However, the targeted multilateral sanctions proved to be effective.
They isolated Libyan officials and also hampered the maintenance of oil drilling and
the exploration for new oil fields. Moreover, after the Reagan administration, the
U.S. efforts to overthrow the Qaddafi regime were put aside. This significantly
meant that if Qaddafi met specific requirements, his regime could survive and
indeed economic benefits would result.
Of course many, many other factors contributed to the transformation of
Libya and its relations with the United States. The cold war ended and the Soviet
Union broke up, which weakened Libya's global position. Global norms valuing
human rights and devaluing revolutionary violence continued to win support and
salience. Significantly, too, the economic conditions within Libya deteriorated
(Anderson 2003, January 19; Porter 2004).
Alternatives. Certainly, during the first years of Qadaffi's rule, constructive
relations were made difficult by the Libyan government's profound objections, not
only to American airbases in Libya, but also to many American foreign policies and
its readiness to violently oppose them. On the American side, the militant,
frequently unilateral, covert and overt actions by the Reagan administrations were
not effective in changing the Libyan government or its policies, and indeed may
have helped intensify the dynamic of escalating destructiveness.
The U.S. government might have done more in the 1980s to mobilize the
international community to isolate Qaddafi; this might have been more feasible if
evidence of Libyan support for terrorist attacks had been early demonstrated by
clear evidence and if the U.S. had abstained from unilateral violent actions to
change the regime in Libya. Furthermore, if U.S. policies in the Middle East were
framed with more attention to the views of the peoples in the region, and not largely
in terms of American concerns such as the cold war and petroleum, the mobilization
of other countries to isolate Libya might have been more plausible (Zunes 2001 ).
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Recognition of the failure of past policies contributed to official policies
becoming somewhat more constructive in the 1990s. In early 1991, officials of the
Bush administration acknowledged the failure of covert actions to destabilize the
Qaddafi regime (St. John 2002). Former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Robert M. (Gates 1998), reasoned that the Pan Am bombing and other
attacks followed the U.S. bombing of Qaddafi's residence.
U.S. actions took
another course. Relying on multilateral diplomacy and international organizations
proved effective. Convincing evidence was presented to U.S. courts about Libyan
officials' bombing of Pan Am 103 and UN Security Resolutions made specific
demands of the Libyan government and then imposed specific multilateral
sanctions. Furthermore, during the Clinton administrations, an agreement was
reached so that the suspects for the bombing of Pan Am 103 were placed on trial.
Finally, during George W. Bush's administration, an agreement was negotiated for
the Libyan dismantlement its weapons of mass destruction programs and American
sanctions were lifted.
The manifest lack of success of Regan's unilateral policies to combat
terrorism based in Lebanon and in Libya is rarely acknowledged, nor are the
unintended adverse consequences discussed by many public figures. The relative
effectiveness of diplomacy, multilateral cooperation, and UN operations in ending
and overcoming terrorist attacks are also not given their due. President George W.
Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address asserted that, "Because of American
leadership and resolve .... the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and
dismantle all of his regime's weapons of mass destruction ... " Bush and his
supporters give little credit to the multi-lateral diplomatic steps, in which they also
engaged, in helping change American-Libyan relations; and instead, they claim that
the decision to go to war in Iraq was decisive in changing Libya (Apostolou 2003).
A more realistic portrayal of the history of relations between Libya and America by
the Bush administration would have better served America (Jentleson 2005).
Nongovernmental organizations and institutions in America could have
played a larger role in conducting a more constructive struggle against Libyan
support of terrorist attacks against the United States. For example, the news media
might have provided a more comprehensive portrayal of the changing relations with
Libya, rather than largely reporting what government officials claimed without
assessing the claims. When unfortunate events occurred, they were rarely
connected to prior American actions, except in the most grievous cases.
Furthermore, the success of diplomacy and of multilateral actions, received too little
coverage; the effectiveness of the UN authorized sanctions in bringing about the
Libyan handover of the indicted agents might have been received little attention.
American intellectuals and scholars, activist voluntary organizations, as
well as other public interest organizations might have better recognized and drawn
attention to the dangers posed by Qaddafi's adventurism to regional and global
order. Condemnations of the Libyan's support of violent attacks conducted by
organizations in other countries could be made without linking them to support for
seeking to overthrow the Qaddafi regime.
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Various public interest organizations might also have done more to critique
the unilateral and provocative strategies pursued by the Reagan administration.
Further, they might have done more to develop and promote alternative strategies.
The people-to-people diplomatic efforts pursued by Qaddafi perhaps might have
been turned by Americans to influence the Libyans themselves and over time alter
the Libyan government. This pattern occurred successfully in the case of
American-Soviet cultural exchanges, which contributed to the changes in Soviet
elite thinking, and ultimately to the transformation and collapse of the Soviet Union.
Conclusions

Americans have had a great variety of experiences with terrorism. In this
article, I have examined instances of terrorism that vary in method, agent, and
target. The context and the sequence of interactions within which they were
embedded also have differed. Moreover, and of particular interest here, the
responses of American officials and non-officials in dealing with the attacks varied
and so did the results.
The evidence about the diverse terrorist acts and responses to them over
many years suggests a few generalizations, as these two cases illustrate. The
generalizations are inferred from the evidence presented here and are guided by the
results of research, theory-building, and experience in the practice of CR, as
discussed in the first part of this article. The evidence indicates that if officials act
covertly, rely largely on military options, and act unilaterally their actions tend not
to have the desired effects. Conversely, officials' overt actions, reliance on noncoercive as well as coercive measures, and utilization of multilateral institutions
were less likely to have undesired effects. At times, U.S. government actions were
regarded as provocative by those targeted, seeming to necessitate a more escalating
response by them.
Furthermore, taking into account the needs and concerns of the antagonist,
at least to some degree, facilitated making settlements that might otherwise have
been unreachable or more costly to achieve. In the case of the hostage takers in
Lebanon this may have been obtaining the release of some Lebanese prisoners, for
Libya, it may have been the assurance that the regime's survival was not threatened.
A variety of intermediaries played important roles in mediation and in influencing
the adversaries so as to bring about a settlement of particular issues and to help
transform the conflict so that it would be conducted less antagonistically.
Non-officials generally did not play major direct roles in responding to the
terrorist attacks, but they had some indirect effects. The discussion of alternatives
suggests that many non-official groups should have been more critical of official
policies. American interests are not well served by silent acquiescence when
officials pursue mistaken policies. The alternatives noted here also entail nongovernmental actors undertaking direct and indirect actions that would have been
more proactive.
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Officials and non-officials made mistakes, which deserve to be recognized and
reflected upon. Some under-utilized alternative ways U.S. officials and private
citizens might have acted warrant discussion.
Consideration of such
alternatives should be a matter of course, in order to improve future policies
(Hastings 2004 }. There is no way of knowing that the outcome would have
been highly successful if a particular alternative policy had been followed. But
conjectures about alternatives in the past can help broaden to options considered
in the ongoing and future struggles against terror attacks. This analysis helps
account for the failures of current official American policies to counter what it
regards as terrorism and has implications for constructing more effective
strategies.
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Abstract

The issue of cultural variation in conflict mediation has attracted considerable
interest, probably because of wide-ranging theoretical, methodological, and ethical
implications. Scholars are raising increasing questions about both generic theories
of the mediation process and past conceptualizations of the culture construct. This
article reviews theoretical perspectives on culture and conflict mediation and
discusses them in relation to fieldwork conducted in the Gambia among three ethnolinguistic groups. Some local and cross-cultural patterns in the mediation process
were found These patterns are associated with variables such as ethnicity, gender,
and social status. However, comparative analysis on the individual level revealed
considerable diversity in praxis, suggesting that cross-cultural studies should go
beyond descriptions of group tendencies. Indeed, the amount of variation in the data
implies a need to reconsider aspects ofprevailing approaches to conflict mediation.
The conclusion includes recommendations for further theory development and
research on this vital topic.
Introduction

There has been a surge of interest in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
since the 1970s. The United Nations, regional organizations, the World Bank,
NGOs, development agencies, and many others want to be involved in or associated
with "conflict resolution." One of the main tools of the field is conflict mediation.
Mediation has been integrated into the legal system of the USA and other countries
and has been exported from the West to other nations around the world. However,
as many scholars have pointed out, we do not know enough about the role of culture
in the mediation process. Some theorists take what Avruch has labeled the generic
perspective, arguing that mediation is "a universal activity conducted according to
generally held assumptions and conventions" (Cohen, 1996, p. 110). That viewpoint
has been strongly influenced by organizational, behavioral, and economic theories
and has either entirely ignored the role of population characteristics and culture in
the mediation process or dismissed them as superficial (see, for example, Doob
1973; Rubin and Sander 1991; Touval and Zartman 1989). Such approaches
minimize concerns about using mediation in multicultural settings and imply that
the focus should be on fine-tuning hegemonic versions of the process.
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Proponents of the opposing stance focus on variation rather than
homogeneity. In that approach mediation is either seen as fundamentally situational
or as structured in divergent ways that correlate with attributes such as ethnicity,
gender, or religion. Recently, critiques of generic theories of mediation have
intensified, raising renewed interest in this area, particularly in terms of sociocultural variation. Some scholars argue that societal variation has only been
examined in a limited fashion. Further, despite the current interest in this problem
there remains a lack of knowledge and theory based upon empirical data derived
from systematically comparative research (Bercovitch 1996; Irani 1999; Merry
1987).
The following article reviews these viewpoints and then evaluates them in
terms of the results of qualitative analyses of data on conflict mediation collected
from different populations in the Gambia. The data indicate that although patterns
do exist, cross-cultural variation is significant. The findings illustrate the complexity
of cultural influences and the necessity of using empirical data and different levels
of analysis in research. Further research of this problem will lead to deeper
understanding of culture and its significance in conflict management.
I!

jl

1!

Defining Mediation

The many definitions of mediation vary in their level of elaboration. There
is much contention in Peace Studies over the exact characteristics of the mediation
process, making definition at all but the most basic level a difficult exercise
(Bercovitch 1996; Cohen 1996; Wehr and Lederach 1996). For example, some
definitions of mediation rest upon controversial issues I such as the question of
mediator neutrality. It is probably premature to employ a detailed definition at this
point in the field's development. When one is striving to map out fundamental
characteristics of a phenomenon, it is best to begin at the most basic level possible;
complexity and specificity of definition should follow the establishment of a firm
foundation. Scholars such as Doob (1993) and Mitchell (1981) have used a
definition of mediation similar to the one employed here, namely "third-party
facilitated negotiation." Wehr and Lederach (1996) have promoted this definition
because it invokes the essence of mediation and facilitates comparative research.
Given that there is still so much to learn about mediation (Bercovitch 1996), it is
fruitful to begin with this broad operationalization and from there, explore patterns,
commonalities, and diversity. Given that there is still so much to learn about
mediation (Bercovitch 1996), it seems appropriate to employ this broad
operationalization of the process for research into the patterns, commonalities, and
discontinuities among various social groups.
Theoretical Perspectives on the Mediation Process

Various theoretical perspectives have been used in the study of conflict
mediation. Despite the different terminologies and labels that are used, it is possible
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to distinguish between two opposed views on the structuring of mediations. These
perspectives are: 1) mediation is a generic process composed of universal
information exchange, bargaining, and problem-solving activities; and 2) the
mediation process is context-specific and can exhibit considerable variation.
First Perspective: Mediation as a Universal or Generic Process
The universal, generic, or behaviorist approach to mediation has been
strongly influenced by organizational, behavioral, and economic theories. It either
entirely ignores the role of population or societal characteristics and culture in the
mediation process or dismisses them as superficial (see, for example, Doob 1973;
Rubin and Sander 1991). Most of the prescriptive literature can be included here as
can much of the work of political scientists, economists, and psychologists.
The prescriptive literature refers to the "how-to" books and manuals and
includes such classics as Fisher and Ury's Getting to Yes ( 1981; see also F olberg
and Taylor 1984; Goldberg, Green, and Sander 1985; Katz and Lawyer 1985).
These publications typically do not include a substantive consideration of cultural
differences. Some of them do not mention this issue at all, although others do
briefly allude to the potential salience of cultural variation. Fisher and Ury's 1991
edition of Getting to Yes included a brief discussion of culture, for instance.
The most prominent example from political science is the work of William
I. Zartman. Zartman has strongly argued against privileging culture in theory and
analysis. In one study, he compares a number of international negotiations and
concludes that "[negotiation] is a universal process, using a finite number of
behavioral patterns, and that cultural differences are simply differences in style and
language" (Zartman and Berman 1982: 226). He has emphatically dismissed
concerns over cultural variation, saying that "Culture is indeed relevant to the
understanding of the negotiation process, every bit as relevant as [the] breakfast [the
negotiators ate], and to much the same extent" (Zartman 1993: 227; Avruch 1998).
One of his arguments is that the existence of a universal diplomatic culture obviates
the relevance of cultural differences in international negotiations. Zartman prefers to
concentrate on contextual factors such as whether conflicts are "ripe" for mediation
(1985; Touval and Zartman 1985). It should be noted that his work is based largely
upon archival data, rather than systematically collected empirical data2.
Bargaining theory is largely based upon mathematical and economic
paradigms. These perspectives promote a generic view of humanity in which
individuals make choices based upon a benefit-cost analysis of their actions and the
perceived consequences. Bargaining theory has contributed to the prominence of the
problem-solving view of mediation. The work of Howard Raiffa (1982), a
mathematician who has been very influential in applying game theory and decision
analysis to negotiation theory, has profoundly influenced mediation theory
(Zeckhauser and others 1997). More sophisticated versions of rational choice
theory, such as that of Ostrom (1990), attempt to address socio-cultural variability,
but still tend to de-emphasize the significance of society and culture. "[Once the
dispute] process is linked with utility-whether utility be conceived in terms of the
universalist maximization of interest or the pursuit of indigenous values-it is a
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short step to treating the socio-cultural context as 'given' and its relationship to the
dispute as unproblematic" (Comaroff and Roberts 1981, cited in Avruch 1998: 76).
Burton (1986, 1990), Doob (1971, 1973, 1974, 1993), and Kelman's (1972,
1976, 1979) analytical problem-solving workshops are prominent examples of
generic approaches to conflict mediation from the field of social psychology. The
contingency perspective and the strategic choice theory of negotiation are other
examples (see Carnevale 1986; Carnevale and Rhoades 1999; Keashly and Fisher
1996)3 • As discussed below other social psychologists have focused on cognitive
development (as opposed to culture) as a source of variation in conflict resolution.
The communication literature may also be included here. This work has
highlighted the relevance of culture in mediation, but it has also contributed to the
view of cultural differences in mediation as a stylistic issue, rather than a potential
influence on the actual process itself. Building on the work of Edward Hall (1969,
1973, 1976), this body of work has explored the difficulties inherent in
communicating across cultures (see, for example, Condon and Yousef 1975;
Gudykunst and Kim 1984) and the effects that this can have on conflict
management (Cohen 1987, 1991; Ting-Toomey 1985, 1988). By framing the effect
of culture on negotiations as a matter of communicating effectively; this literature
implies that there is a deep structure to the mediation process and intercultural
variation is essentially stylistic.
The eminent anthropologist Philip Gulliver suggested that there are basic
cross-cultural similarities to negotiations. Gulliver analyzed negotiations in two
settings: among the Arusha and Ndendeuli of Tanzania and among Americans and
Canadians. He developed a processual model of the negotiation process based on
what he saw as cross-cultural information exchanging and bargaining activities
(Gulliver 1979). Gulliver's linear, staged model corresponds closely to the model of
mediation predominant in the literature and in court-annex mediation programs.
Despite the dearth of empirical studies, the generic approach to mediation
has long dominated the field. This approach minimizes concerns about using
mediation in multicultural settings. It implies that the focus should be on fine-tuning
and maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation process commonly promoted in
the literature by, for example, enhancing one's communication skills so as to avoid
cross-cultural dissonances and misunderstandings.
Second Perspective: Mediation as a Variable Process
Proponents of the opposing viewpoint emphasize vanation rather than
homogeneity. In this approach context is emphasized, and attributes such as
ethnicity, sex, religion, and age-set are seen as potentially significant. Some have
described mediation as an "art" rather than a science (Meyer 1960). Others posit
that the variables affecting mediation are so numerous and complex that no
meaningful analysis of trends is possible (Simkin 1970 cited in Bercovitch and
Houston 1996).
Another argument is that variation in mediation is patterned, usually
according to population attributes and/or cultural identities. Since the 1990s there
has been an upsurge in interest in cultural variation in conflict mediation. Most
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practice in North America remains based on the problem-solving model (Stempel
2002), but a variety of theoretical models now purports to depict intercultural
patterns in mediation. The dichotomies between collectivist versus individualist
societies and high context versus low context communication patterns are prominent
examples. Due to a lack of empirically based and systematic comparative research,
it is not clear how significant socio-cultural variation in mediation may be, and this
is currently an area of considerable discussion and controversy (Avruch, Black, and
Scimecca 1991; Bercovitch 1996; Irani 1999; Merry 1987). The ongoing debate has
raised theoretical, practical, and ethical concerns about the nature and practice of
mediation.
Contemporary critiques of the culture construct have lambasted misuse of
the culture construct. Theorists such as Avruch (1998) and Handwerker (2002) call
for a shift in analysis from "meta cultures" to subcultures and even the individual
level in analysis. They view cultural identities as dynamic, complex, and
multidimensional, arguing against the conflation of culture with ethnicity or
national identity, and urging that attention be paid to the various components that
make up cultural systems. The following section elaborates on the perspective of
mediation as variable with an overview of the research record on factors that may be
associated with the structuring of the mediation process4.
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Ethnicity. The research literature includes some discussion of the potential
relationship between ethnic identities and patterning in mediation styles. For
example, scholars have written about Middle Eastern (Abu-Nimer 1996; Irani 1999;
Witty 1980) and African conflict resolution (Gluckman 1967; Hagberg, Helander,
and Unge 1995; Mengisteab 2002; Rugege 1995). Several fascinating projects have
investigated the role of ethnicity in influencing conflict, problem-solving, and
reconciliation behavior in the USA. Kochman (1981), Gadlin (1994), and Davidson
(2002) examined differences between Whites and African-Americans in conflict
behavior and dispute management. Interestingly, Kochman and Davidson
concentrated on elucidating ethnic differences, while Gadlin emphasized that
making generalizations based on race and ethnicity may be problematic.
An intriguing pilot project in Canada found that immigrants' regions of
origin correlated with marked variation in preferences for certain mediation
activities (Lund, Morris, and Duryea 1994)5. For example, that research indicated
that disputants from some cultural backgrounds may be uncomfortable with the
face-to-face interactions that characterize North American mediation events.
According to Lund and colleagues, such individuals prefer indirect mediation with
the peacemakers shuttling back and forth between the different disputants 6 • They
argue that "the linear staged model prevalent throughout North America" may not
be compatible with other cultural orientations (1994, p. 5).
Gender. Research on the impact of gender in mediation patterns has
produced contradictory results. Mediator interviews by Watson and Kasten found
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that gender identities significantly correlated with behavioral vanatlon in
negotiation (1989). Additional North American studies by Gourley (1994), Picard
(2002), and Weingarten and Douvan (1985) indicate that male and female mediators
conceptualize their roles and responsibilities, and therefore the mediation process, in
a dissimilar fashion. There is also evidence that in North America female mediators
are more facilitative in style and more oriented toward relationships and
reconciliation, while males are more likely to focus on the immediate problem that
brought about the mediation attempt (Dewhurst and Wall 1994; Weingarten and
Douvan 1985). Others have argued ''against focusing on gender as a source of
variation in conflict management (Keashly 1994; Ruble and Schneer 1994; Watson
1994). Both sides refer to studies that support their view, while other projects have
produced mixed results (Dewhurst and Wall 1994). Picard's (2002) recent
examination of gender in mediation concluded that further research is required.
Religion. Studies of religious influences in third-party peacemaking have
suggested that confessional affiliation is associated with behavioral diversity in
mediation. For example, an article by Galtung (1997) discusses the influence of
cosmology on "Christian" (adherents of the Abrahamic religions) and "Buddhist"
(adherents of Eastern religions) conflict and conflict management behavior. AbuNimer (1996), Irani (1999), and Rosen (1989) describe Islamic approaches to
conflict management, and Merry (2000) undertook a cultural analysis of Mennonite
conventions in peace-making7• On the other hand, Witty's study of mediation in
Lebanon (1980, see also King-Irani 2000) implies that there are broad similarities
across religious groups (in this case Christians and Muslims) 8 • With the exception
of Witty, all of these authors posit that there are distinctive aspects to the conflict
resolution techniques of different religious communities.
Age-sets. Age-sets are a prominent feature of Gambian social organization
(Sagnia 1983; Sonko-Godwin 1986, 1997), and anthropologists have observed
generational differences in social groups across the globe. Although no research
examining this issue in the specific context of mediation could be identified, several
studies by social psychologists have investigated relationships between age and
conflict resolution. Fry (2000) studied cognitive development and reconciliation
goals, strategies, and behaviors among children. He found that as children get older,
they become more adept at addressing interpersonal difficulties. Osterman and
others (1996, p.186) reviewed the literature on this subject and concluded that
among children and adolescents "conflict resolution skills improve with age." Their
cross-cultural study produced similar findings to Fry's, linking cognitive
development to conflict management skills and techniques (see also Kolominski and
Zhiznevskii 1992 and Leyva and Furth 1986). In addition, researchers at the
University of Hawaii, Manoa have identified generational differences in the cultural
perspectives of family members who migrated to Hawaii from other countries
(Bruce Barnes, personal communication, 2004).
Individual Identity and Personality. As mentioned previously, some
anthropologists now advocate looking at culture on the individual level. The idea is
that, despite the existence of some group-level patterns and structures, individuals
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have their own multi-layered identities and sets of experiences. Group-level
generalizations overlook the role of such variables in cognitive processing and
behavioral patterning.
The conflict management literature has raised the possibility of variation on
the individual level influencing mediations. Rubin and Sander (1991) argue that
negotiators deal with each other as individuals, moving beyond the level of ethnic or
group identification. Additionally, Picard's (2002) study on gender found that
educational background and length of experience as a mediator were associated
with variance in Canadian mediators' perceptions of the purpose of mediation and
role of mediators.
A number of other theorists have also discussed variation in mediator styles
or strategies (see, for example, Kressel et al. 1994; Silbey and Merry 1986). Riskin
(1996) provides a good overview of these discussions. Their studies indicate that
although individuals frequently employ varying styles in different contexts, they do
tend to have a particular style to which they generally adhere. These findings
suggest that human behavior oscillates between stylized, repetitive, socially
structured patterns and more inchoate or contextual variations, thereby underscoring
the conditionality of social dynamics and the situational nature of human behavior.
Study Design and Methodology
The research design of this study was shaped by three propositions. The
first is the previously mentioned idea of culture as multidimensional. The project
codebook therefore included a variety of relevant participant characteristics, such as
religious affiliation, gender identity, home village, and age-set. Examining
additional factors, such as dispute type and the social status of the mediators and
disputants, made it possible to control for other potential sources of variation in
peacemaking activities. Human behavior is often conditional, based on the context
in which social action will take place; a variety of situational factors were therefore
considered. Employing different levels of analysis further highlighted social
patterning. Mediation activities were compared according to the particular identities
of the mediation participants and their collective identities; the analysis included the
individual, intra-group, and inter-group levels.
The second proposition is that methodological triangulation enables a
deeper investigation of complex social phenomena. Accordingly, both descriptive
and empirical data were collected, and the analysis incorporated participatory,
qualitative, and quantitative methods. The findings presented here are derived from
three years of field research conducted in southwestern Gambia between 1999 and
2005. The collected data include extensive ethnographic data and interviews, 129
semi-structured interviews with mediators, 21 panel sessions with expert
peacemakers, and 132 observed cases of mediated disputes 9. The descriptive data -ethnographic observations, interviews, and panel sessions were used to identify
categories and activities common to local mediations, to establish what constitutes
normal procedures versus outlying divergences, and to control for inter-subjective
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bias. The panels were stratified according to ethnicity, age-set, gender, village of
residence, and religion.
Third, the project design addressed problems of idealized representations of
behavior and informant accuracy. Anthropological research has revealed significant
problems with informant recall, underlining the limited accuracy of respondents'
answers based on memory (Bernard and others 1994). Respondents' representations
of social phenomena may also be influenced by ideological factors or may serve
utilitarian purposes. Scholars of dispute management have also demonstrated the
problems with recalled data. Kressel and Pruitt found "weak correspondence
between retrospective accounts and what actually happened in mediation" (Kressel
and Pruitt 1989b: 430). In their study, mediators were given checklists of activities
to fill out immediately after the conclusion of a session. When these lists were
compared to empirical records of the mediations, significant discrepancies were
found. Due to such issues, conflict scholars have called for empirical data on what
mediators actually do (for example, Avruch 1991; Bercovitch and Houston 1996).
In the study presented here, much attention was given to methodology and
addressing the problem of intersubjective bias. The collection and analysis of
empirical data was a top priority; the observed mediations were meticulously
translated and transcribed. All data were carefully processed; group work and back
translation were used to minimize interpreter bias, for example 10 • A purposive
sampling strategy was used to maximize data quality and quantity. I identified
active mediators in the target communities and worked with those who were willing
and able to participate effectively in the project11 • Initially, I concentrated on formal
and informal village officials such as village headmen and the women in charge of
female circumcision. Interviews with such high-profile individuals constituted one
point of approach. However, it quickly became apparent that many persons who did
not hold a formal title or position were also prominent peacemakers. Ethnographic
interviews generated lists of active mediators and discussions were held with many
individuals. Doing village-wide surveys and making connections with many
different people mitigated the dangers of being limited to specific networks. In
order to maximize the accuracy of collected information, data processing was done
very carefully; teams of translators were used to reduce the possibility of interpreter
bias, for example.
Micro-level mediations were the focus of this inquiry; although data on
large group-level conflicts were collected, the analysis here is based primarily on
peacemaking between individuals or small groups. Mediations dealt with conflicts
between family and clan members, spouses, neighbors, friends, and relative
strangers. The disputes encompassed a variety of issues such as land disputes, crops
damaged by domestic animals, marital and domestic conflicts, personal insults and
slights, and public policy concerns.
The data were analyzed using qualitative and quantitative methods. Coding
was done on the 121 observed cases using The Ethnograph data processing and
analysis package. Cases of mediation were coded according to the activities that
occurred throughout the mediation process. Each case was also tagged according to
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the characteristics of the participants, the dispute, and the mediation context. These
constituted a set of potential independent variables derived from the literature, my
applied background in mediation, and the inductive data. We can distinguish
between two categories of such variables, namely the population characteristics of
the participants and situational data. Key participant characteristics include
religious, gender, and ethnic identities; some examples of contextual variables that
were controlled for include the type of dispute in question, the level of formality of
the intervention effort, the number of participants, and the nature of the social
relations between the participants. The goal was to identify and control for variables
that may affect mediation behavior and throw cultural influences into relief.
The cases were divided into different sets according to these tags and were
searched for themes, patterns, and areas of variation. This process produced
matrices of mediation activities and potential independent variables. Data sets were
imported into the statistical package SPSS for further analysis. Most of the potential
independent variables were nominal, so cross-tabulation was an appropriate tool for
examining what activities occurred in different sets of cases. The cross-tabulation
tables measured the frequency of specific mediation activities and highlighted their
associations with various potential independent and control variables. The resulting
relationships were analyzed for statistical significance using chi-squared and
Fisher's Exact Tests. Several of the key findings derived using these various
methodologies are presented below.

The Gambia
The Gambia is a small country of 11,300 square kilometers with slightly
over one million inhabitants located on the coast of West Africa. In pre-colonial
times parts of the Gambia were subsumed into different local kingdoms and politics,
such as the W ollof states and the kingdoms of Kombo and Kaabu, while other parts
were ruled by local chiefs or councils of elders (Faal 1999; Godwin-Sonko 1997).
The Gambia was a colony of the United Kingdom from 1816 to 1965, however
British influence outside the urban areas was minimal and the Gambia was the
ultimate example of indirect rule style preferred by British colonial authorities. The
Gambia never supported much of a settler population and had a very limited
colonial infrastructure.
The Gambian population is ethnically and religiously diverse. There are
seven ethnic groups that are considered as indigenous. The majority of Gambians
are Muslims with significant populations of animists and Christians as well. There
is considerable religious syncretism as the practices of many Gambians in rural
areas incorporate both elements from one of the Abrahamic religions and animism.
This study was based in the southwestern comer of the country and in
particular the district of Kombo South. This area has a higher proportion of
Manjagos, Jolas, and non-Muslims than most other rural areas in the Gambia. The
presence of ethnically distinct villages in the district helped facilitate inter-ethnic
comparison.
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Sample populations were drawn from the Mandinka, Jola, and Manjago
inhabitants of the region. These groups were chosen because of the diversity of their
pre-colonial and contemporary socio-political systems; they are differentiated by
religion and by shared norms, values, and habituated behaviors (Sagnia 1983;
Sonko-Godwin 1986, 1997). In fact, they were arguably the most dissimilar of all
the Gambian ethnic groups. Much of the study data was collected in ethnically
distinct villages where contemporary manifestations of historical socio-political
characteristics are prevalent.
The Mandinka are the most numerous group in Kombo South and rural
Gambia in general. Their pre-colonial history was characterized by highly stratified
state-level agrarian societies and kingdoms. They are an overwhelmingly Muslim
population and make up the leadership of that community in the area.
Pre-colonial Jola social organization was much less hierarchical, and the
Jola engaged in much more hunting and gathering than the Mandinka. The Jola are
the only historically acephalous Gambian ethnic group. Although village chiefs
were imposed on them during the colonial era, their chiefs are markedly less
influential than those in Mandinka villages, and they share their authority with
councils of elders. The Jola are also more religiously diverse than the Mandinka.
The Mandinka forcibly converted many of them to Islam, but in the early 21 st
century, large animist and Christian-animist Jola populations remained extant.
The Manjago are an immigrant population from Guinea-Bissau. There has
been a great deal of interaction and intermarriage between Muslim Jolas and
Mandinkas, but this has not been the case with the Manjagos of Kombo South. In
southern Gambia Manjago settlements are often clustered around Mandinka and
Jola areas, and their communities are much more insular than those of the other two
groups.
The Gambia offered an interesting site for this study because the extremely
limited colonial infrastructure left most dispute management in the hands of local
authorities and residents. In addition, rural Gambians generally share a negative
view of the legal system and emphasize the importance of settling disputes
informally. Local mediation procedures have therefore played a pivotal role in the
nation's history and have considerable significance on the contemporary scene. The
current situation is characterized by legal pluralism; there are a number of different
arenas for formal and informal dispute settlement. In Kombo South, villagers can
choose between a variety of potential fora, such as a hearing at the home of the
village chief, the tribunal court in the district capital, the magistrate's court in the
division capital, and for Muslims, the Islamic court near the national capital. All of
the options other than mediation involve significant transaction costs in terms of
time and money.
Discussion

Qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted on transcripts of
actual mediations and of interviews and panel sessions (stratified by age, gender,
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and ethnicity) with local mediators 12 . The results revealed considerable variation in
mediator styles and mediation activities. The variation is not random; it correlates
with certain factors and activities. Variation occurred at both the group and
individual levels and there were also discontinuities across cases mediated by the
same persons. Each mediation case was unique to some degree, but there are
recognizable themes and patterns. Some observed patterns are described below.
In interviews and panel sessions people tended to emphasize structure and
homogeneity, but their own vignettes about past mediations revealed diversity in
practice. Thorough questioning also elicited comments and observations about
heterogeneity in praxis and the significance of contextual factors. The procedure
that mediators usually described when asked "grand-tour" questions (very general
and open-ended questions designed to elicit emic perspectives on an issue) about
mediations was strikingly similar to descriptions of ho'oponopono from Hawai'i, the
Gada system of the Oromo of Ethiopia, and becharaa' of the Semai of Malaysia
(Shook 1995; Tuso 2000; Robarchek 1997). This model was also common in the
empirical cases from the Gambia and is outlined below.
•Pre-meeting activities: Initiation of mediation effort, information
gathering, mediator caucuses with disputants, mediator strategy sessions
•Introduction: Setting the stage, creating positive atmosphere prayer,
statements emphasizing social ties and norms and values promoting harmony,
defining the agenda
•Disputant testimony and narratives
•Discussion: can include the following activities
-Judging, stating guilt
-Advising disputants
-Negotiation, only occurs in certain cases often the mediator just urges
reconciliation without negotiation over substantive issue
•Plan making: Exploring options, debating plans, mediator sometimes
proposes the plan rather than eliciting it from the disputants
•Ritualization: Shaking hands, prayer, sharing food and drink
The above model should be seen as a simplification of a widespread pattern
in the Gambian data. Although there often is a progression through these activities
and stages, meetings can jump back and forth between activities and stages, skip
certain of them entirely, and in general differ considerably from the list above. The
process is not homogenous or unilinear.
In fact, the Gambian mediations demonstrated considerable variety in
structure. Some mediation cases involved only caucusing with the disputants; in this
peacemakings the disputants never met jointly with the mediator. Other cases
consisted of only group meetings. The most common procedure was for mediators
to caucus with the disputants first and then bring them together for a group
meeting 13 •
In this modal procedure, most of the information gathering and exchange
and negotiation took place during caucuses. The mediator( s) shuttled back and forth
between the disputants, sometimes carrying messages between them, and always
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encouraging them to settle. In some cases there was a single caucus with each party,
while others featured multiple caucuses. In some of these cases, the group meeting
followed the model presented above with discussions of the dispute, disputant
testimony, assignment of blame and so forth.
Often the substantive negotiations were concluded in the caucus and the
group meeting consisted of a formal reconciliation of the parties and a ritualization
of the agreement. In such cases the mediator( s) did most of the talking during the
group meetings.
The mediator( s) set the stage and gave a short discussion of the situation
(without going into particulars) and the need for settlement. Sometimes the
mediator( s) re-stated judgments arrived at during the caucusing process, other times
they just gave general advice to both disputants. The disputants often did not say
much in such meetings other than to perhaps make a formal statement about the
reconciliation. They usually did not go into the details of the dispute. The group
meeting often concluded with ritualizing activities such as hand-shaking, the
exchange of kola nuts, goods, or money, prayer, the sharing of food, and so forth.
Re-thinking the role o( caucuses in mediation
An examination of the literature reveals a tendency to concentrate on group
meetings as the foundation of the mediation process. Some theorists lump caucuses
in with "pre-mediation activities" while others ignore caucuses completely. Most of
the models from other societies focus on group meetings with much less discussion
of caucuses. This is consistent with praxis in court-annex programs in the USA
where caucuses are typically only an optional adjunct of the group meeting mediators call them during meetings if they feel that they are needed. Another
example is Shook's model of ho'oponopono in which mediator(s) may call a
ho'omalu or "a cooling off period" if tensions get high during the group meeting
with much anger being expressed (1995). In ho'omalu the mediator(s) take the
angry disputant(s) aside and help them vent their negative emotions.
Greater attention should be paid to caucuses as they can play a more
important role than a reading of the literature suggests. Some scholars have noted a
lack of comfort in face-to-face meetings between disputants and a preference for
caucuses among Japanese and members of other Asian societies (Goldstein 1986;
Duryea and Grundison 1993). In the Gambian data caucuses played a very
prominent role and were often pivotal. In one marital mediation, for example, there
were 17 caucuses.
In caucuses the mediator(s) solicited the permission of the disputants to
mediate, listened to the disputants' testimony and narratives, collected and
transmitted messages, and/or used a variety of persuasive tactics to encourage the
disputants to settle. The mediator( s) often discussed the matter with the disputants
identifying relevant topics and seeking out potential points of agreement and so
forth. The caucuses sometimes included discussions of various options and the
selection of a course of action. On occasion, the mediator(s) attempted to impose
their preferred plan. Agreements reached during the caucuses may or may not have
been ritualized in group meetings; some mediation cases consisted solely of
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caucuses. Caucuses also made the negotiation process easier as it could take place
outside of the high pressure setting of a face-to-face meeting.
Caucuses also enabled the circumlocution of social norms that can inhibit
the reconciliation process. In caucuses disputants could express viewpoints and
emotions that would be inappropriate in a group meeting. For example, the
hierarchical nature of Mandinka social structure limited disputants' ability to voice
negative thoughts and feelings in the presence of social superiors. Caucuses
therefore played a vital role in the reconciliation process and in the therapeutic
aspect of mediation, as they allowed disputants to vent negative emotions without
violating social mores.
In caucuses mediators were able to advise the disputants on how to behave
around the other party(s) and what to expect from and what to do in any planned
group meetings. Mediators could also appease disputants without offending the
other party. In addition, they could give disputants the impression (whether true or
false) that the other party regretted their actions and that they were eager to settle. In
one observed case, the mediator told each of the disputants that the other party
wanted to reconcile. Although many W estem readers might doubt the efficacy of
such a tactic, the mediator was able to effect a sustainable restoration of the
friendship between the two men in question.
Ethnic identities were associated with divergences in caucusing. In both the
descriptive and empirical data, Manjagos relied more heavily on group meetings
than Mandinkas or Jolas. Mediations conducted only through caucuses appeared to
be a very rare tactic among Manjagos, who tend to emphasize face-to-face
communication, judging, and collective rituals.
The study findings suggest that a nuanced approach to caucusing is
necessary for an interculturally sensitive approach to mediation. We should
recognize that certain social groups tend to be more comfortable with caucusing
than others. Group meetings may be important to some persons, while for others
they may hinder effective conflict transformation. However, we should also
recognize that there is no simple formula that we can apply. Persons who generally
rely upon or respond well to caucuses may find them inappropriate in certain
situations. It appears that an informed flexibility is most appropriate. Mediators
should be aware of general patterns among target populations, but they should also
be attuned to the dynamics of the case in question and able to adjust their strategy
accordingly.
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More Examples of Variation in Mediation Activities in the Gambian Data
Significant variation was found in relation to two common activities that are
common features of the mediation process cross-culturally: mediator collection of
disputant narratives and testimony, and the assignment of blame.
Mediator collection of disputant narratives and testimony
Soliciting and listening to disputant explanations and viewpoints are an
integral part of the mediation processes described in the ethnographic and
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prescnptlve literature. This activity is part of the information gathering and
exchange process that some consider as vital to the negotiation and mediation
process (Gulliver 1979). It serves several purposes as it enables negotiation, the reframing of disputes through the exchange of viewpoints, feelings, and perhaps
previously unavailable or misunderstood information. It is also a key part of the
therapeutic aspect of mediation highlighted by researchers such as Gibbs ( 1963 ),
Robarchek (1997), and Shook (1985).
Gambian mediators included collection of disputant narratives in their
explanations of the process, and this activity was common in the empirical data as
well. Some variation did occur in relation to this activity, however. In interviews
and panel sessions some mediators stated that in some cases they instruct the
disputants not to relate the details of the dispute to them. There was some
association with ethnicity here as more women respondents than men mentioned
this pattern. This procedure occurred in the empirical cases as well and was
associated with particular contextual variables.
One such variable was related to Gambian social structures and related
cultural norms. In some Mandinka and Jola cases with disputants with significant
status disparities the lower status disputant did not give testimony in the presence of
the senior disputant. In such cases, unless they were able to caucus privately with
the mediators, the junior disputants did not usually get a chance to express their
viewpoints and feelings.
For example, Gambian social groups share strong beliefs about the
hierarchical relationship between parents and children. In a mediation case between
a father and his son, the mediator was informed about the dispute by the son's
brother, but was not given much detail about the conflict. The mediator caucused
with the father and then called in the son for a group meeting. The father repeated
his explanation of the dispute in the group meeting, but the son restricted his
comments to a plea for forgiveness and a promise that he would never again get into
a conflict with his father. The meeting ended successfully with a ritual event of the
type that generally signals a successful reconciliation. Interestingly, after the
meeting ended, the son accompanied the mediator as he walked home, and during
the walk, he expressed his view on the dispute.
In other caucuses and group meetings, the mediator(s) said, in their
introductory statements, that they did not want to hear any details about the dispute,
but that did not prevent the disputants from getting into such explanations. That
phenomenon illustrates the significance of this activity. Disputant testimony is often
the most important component of the information collection and exchange
undertaken by mediators. It is also part of the "therapeutic" aspect of mediation
(Robarchek 1997), as the disputants are able to express their viewpoints and
ventilate their feelings.
Another pattern in the empirical data consisted of mediators limiting or
attempting to halt disputant testimony when they felt that it was becoming repetitive
or bringing forth negative emotions. It was also quite common for the mediators to
instruct the disputants not to discuss the causes of the conflict in group meetings
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when the substantive negotiations were completed during pre-meeting caucuses.
However, there were also instances in which there actually was no disputant
testimony in the caucuses or the group meetings, although these were rare. In such
cases the mediators often had heard many of the details of the dispute from other
people so they were already well-informed about it. These mediations were
associated with a particular kind of relationship between the participants specifically when the mediator(s) were of high social status, usually of higher status
than the disputants. Ethnicity was also linked to these cases as they were most
common among Mandinkas and almost absent among Manjagos, who strongly
emphasized reviewing the details of a dispute. The variable of dispute type was also
relevant; many of these cases were marital mediations, for example. A saying in
Mandinka states that when a man and a woman fight in their house at night, and you
go to intervene, you should not ask about the cause of the problem. This pattern
differs from the models presented in the cross-cultural and the Western literature.
Judging, evaluating, and assigning blame
The ideology that dominates the literature and most training materials in the
US encourages mediators to avoid evaluating disputes or at least to avoid expressing
any evaluations that they may form. The assumption that mediators should be
neutral facilitators who do things like use "objective criteria" to help "separate the
people from the problem" is deeply ingrained in Western mediation ideology
(Cohen 1996; Della Noce 2001) 14· Despite the dominance of this viewpoint in the
literature, evaluative approaches are more common than one might presume 15 •
The predominant ideology in the Gambia is that mediators should make
explicit judgments about a case. Mediators are often expected to "tell the truth" and
"give the party their rights." 16 When questioned about this respondents generally
stated that it was an integral part of the mediation and resolution process often
adding that if one does not tell the parties who is right and who is wrong then the
conflict will never end. This is congruent with descriptions of mediation from other
African and non-industrialized societies (see, for example, Bourdieu 1965; Cloke
1990; Davidson 1966; King-Irani 2000; Robarchek 1997; Tuso 2000).
Under further questioning some mediators went on to add that not all
mediations included this activity as it could jeopardize settlement of the dispute if
one of the parties rejected the judgment or became upset. In fact many of the
collected cases did not include judging or stating guilt. This variation is associated
with ethnicity as Manjago mediators were more likely to insist that judging was
necessary for dispute resolution than Jola or Mandinka respondents. In addition, a
higher proportion ofManjago than Mandinka and Jola cases included this activity.
Mandinka, and to a lesser extent Jola, respondents also stated that lower
status disputants (wives, younger siblings, children, and so on) should not be told
that the other higher status disputants (husbands, elder siblings, parents) are guilty.
Instead the younger disputant should be criticized for having a conflict with their
social superior. Expected variation along gender lines did not occur here - most
female Mandinka and Jola respondents said that wives should not be told that they
are right in disputes with their husbands. Ethnicity was significant; however, as
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Manjago respondents were much less likely to say this. Twice during panel sessions
with men a Manjago said that lower-status disputants (specifically wives) should
always be told that they are guilty, but they were immediately challenged on this by
the other participants. The empirical and descriptive data are fairly congruent on
this point. Although Mandinka (in particular) and Jola mediators did blame higherstatus disputants in some cases, this was rare. Manjago cases in which the mediators
blamed the higher-status disputants were much more common.
The number of mediation participants and the forum in which it took place
are also associated with whether the mediator(s) expressed their opinions on
disputant culpability. Across ethnic groups, large formal meetings in which
disputants met together with multiple mediators, witnesses, and/or onlookers tended
to include the assigning blame activity. Most of the cases in which the mediators did
not express judgments about the merits of each disputant's position were
characterized by fewer participants and a more private setting.
Individual level variation in Gambia
Contemporary anthropological approaches assert that cultural analysis
should focus on the individual rather than the group level (Avruch 1998,
Handwerker 2002). This study incorporated this micro level of analysis by
investigating individual level patterns and variation in mediation. The results
suggest that there should be more attention paid to this in the cross-cultural
literature.
In terms of Riskin's grid ( 1996) Gambian mediators overall tend to lean
towards the evaluative broad style. In addition to assigning blame, Gambian
mediators often offer proposals and plans for settlement and they can be quite
assertive in promoting their ideas. Although in some cases they focus only on the
immediate concrete problem or issue (a "narrow" orientation), their definition and
approach to the problem is generally broad with much concern for restoring
harmony and the long-term relationship between the parties. In some cases Gambian
mediators also exhibit concern for the maintenance of community norms and values
and apply them to the dispute, praising and criticizing the disputants in relation to
their actions' conformity with societal conventions. In this way Gambian mediators'
orientations resemble those found in other non-industrialized societies (Cloke 1990;
Faure 2000).
Two important caveats should be applied here in order to avoid
overgeneralization. The anthropologist was able to work intensively with several
mediators and gathered many cases from each of them. Individual level variation in
mediator styles was quite apparent in the empirical data. Some variation was found
between members of different clans. In particular, two mediators from the same
distinctive clan exhibited some commonalities in their mediation styles. Their
approaches were not identical, however, and in fact every mediator appeared to
utilize a characteristic style. For example, some mediators would begin their
meetings with elaborate introductions, setting the stage, defining the agenda, and so
forth, while others would quickly proceed to the issues at hand. Some mediators
were more facilitative (as opposed to evaluative and directive). Such mediators were
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more likely to work with the disputants to explore options for settlement, while
peacemakers often imposed their own plans on the disputants. The complexity in
variation in mediator behavior was even more extensive, however, as the same
individuals also mediated differently in different cases. In other words individuals'
mediation styles are not absolute, as they react to the situation at hand and employ
varying tactics based on the context.
These findings are consistent with those from studies of mediator style in
the USA (See, for example, Silbey and Merry 1986; Kressel and Pruitt 1989b;
Kresse! and others 1994). One of the major contributions of this study is the
analysis at the individual level as this is entirely lacking in the cross-cultural
literature on mediation. This gap in the research record should be addressed in order
to deepen our understanding of culture and its significance in conflict management.
Conclusion
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The conceptualization of mediation as a process with an intrinsic structure
is a serious oversimplification. Although some simplification is necessary for theory
development, any model -- particularly any unilinear model -- purporting to
represent the structure of mediations is inadequate. The amount of variation found
in Gambian mediations demonstrates the need to explore the range of different
mediation styles that exist and what variables are associated with them. The fact that
some mediation cases do not include an activity as seemingly central as the
disputants narrating their points of view to the mediators and/or each other
illustrates the limitations ofrigid generic models of the mediation process.
Variation in the Gambian data associated with attributes such as ethnicity
and clan membership suggests that culture does matter. Minor differences in
mediation style according to gender were also observed 17• Sophisticated approaches
to culture are needed to explore the dynamics of such relationships and the interplay
between culture and contextual factors.
There is great need for further study of this topic. On the one hand, there are
similarities between the Gambian data and mediations in other non-industrialized
societies (for example, the prevalence of blaming by mediators and their focus on
reconciliation). In that sense distinctions made by Ting-Toomey and others about
Eastern/high-context/collectivist and Western/low-context/individualist societies
have some heuristic value. Such dichotomies have dominated the study of cultural
influence on conflict management and mediation (see, for example, Barnes 1994;
Duryea and Grundison 1993; Galtung 1997; Goldstein 1986; Myers and Filner
1997). However, the Gambian data indicate that relying solely on such sweeping
generalizations is not sufficient as they account for only part of the picture. In fact,
this study suggests that even models that purport to represent the mediation process
used by a particular population are flawed. Such models are useful as general
guidelines or templates to use as a beginning point for analysis and for praxis; a new
prescriptive literature and training model for dealing with culture in conflict
management that relies heavily on these sort of collectivist/high-context and
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individualist/low-context dichotomies is emerging. However, by glossing over interand intra-societal variation they contribute to unfortunate misconceptions about the
mediation process.
Future studies of structure and agency in mediation should attempt to avoid
the theoretical and methodological limitations of past research. A comparison of the
Gambian interview and empirical data indicates that respondents tend to highlight
patterns and can impose structure on complex and varied phenomena. Due to the
intersubjectivity of perception, relying on interview data alone is an insufficient
strategy 18 . Researchers should attempt to combine the rich insights of qualitative,
descriptive data with empirical observation.
Researchers must also be open to the possibility of variation and not
overlook it in favor of creating a neat theory or tidy model. When creating models,
scholars should avoid using numbered stages or steps, as this reinforces
conceptualizations of the mediation process as uni linear and adds to the reductionist
confusion in mediation theory. A fluid, unnumbered depiction of stages more
accurately portrays the dynamic nature of the mediation process. Further study that
incorporates the above recommendations will enable the field of mediation to move
forward and help it attain its rich potential for contributing to the betterment of
human social life.
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has been vigorous debate over the issue of mediator neutrality. Some
scholars argue that mediators must be neutral, while others refer to their research as
evidence that the concept of the neutral mediator is linked to societal norms and values (for
example, Cloke 1990; Cohen 1996; Kochman 1981; Lund et al. 1994).
2Zartman edited a recent volume on African conflict management techniques
indicating a possible broadening of his view on societal variation. However, in his
introduction he suggests that "traditional" African peace-making procedures are probably
examples of universal processes or phenomena. He does note that this question requires
testing and he calls for studies (such as this one) investigating universal and particular
aspects of conflict transformation (2000).
3Keashly and Fisher's contingency perspective asserts that various kinds of thirdparty interventions are appropriate for different types and stages of conflicts (see Webb and
others 1996 for a critique). The strategic choice model espoused by Carnevale and others has
been influenced by rational choice theory and uses decision analysis to examine behavior in
mediations.
4The variables below do not provide an exhaustive list. In the USA, for example,
socio-economic status, profession, and other variables affect cultural identities and
mediation styles (Handwerker 2002; Goldstein 1986; Picard 2002; Silbey and Merry 1986).
However, these variables are not significant in the context of rural Gambia.
5The comparisons made in this study focused on differences in mediation
conventions between individualist and collectivist, or North Atlantic and non-W estem
societies.
6This is known as "caucusing." Goldstein notes a similar preference in Asian
societies ( 1986, see also Lebra 1984 for a study of this preference among Japanese). She
also reviews a study in which Hong Kong Chinese recommended caucusing and Americans
recommended face-to-face meetings as a strategy for dealing with business disputes (Bond
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and others. 1985 cited in Goldstein 1986). Caucusing is also a prominent feature of many
Gambian mediations.
7See Abu-Nimer 2001 for a good discussion of the significance of religion in
conflict management.
8lnterestingly, Galtung lumps Christianity and Islam together under the label
"Christianity" in his analysis ( 1997).
9"Expert peacemakers" refers to well-known conflict intervenors who are
frequently sought out for their reputation as effective mediators. Observed cases often
involved multiple sessions dedicated to resolving the dispute in question; in one case there
were seventeen separate meetings.
10Due to the virtually inevitable tensions with research assistants, researchers who
engage in intensive, long-term ethnographic investigations of dispute management have the
opportunity to explore their subject from an alternative, reflexive perspective. My dedication
to thorough data processing led to occasional debates with project participants. These and
similar experiences provided fascinating insights and much food for thought.
11 Conflict management can be a highly sensitive subject. Extensive relationship
building and language learning were essential for gaining the trust of potential project
participants. The accuracy of the data was a key concern, and checks for accuracy were
included in the processing techniques. One portion of the data supplied by a single informant
was found to be suspect; consequently, all of the materials associated with that person were
discarded.
12The fieldwork was conducted between 1999 and 2002 and was made possible by
a David Niddrie grant through the Center for African Studies of the University of Florida
and a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar Fellowship from the United States Institute of
Peace.
13Tuso's decription of the Gada system of the Oromo of Ethiopia also follows this
pattern. In his 13 step model step five consists of the mediators caucusing with the
disputants to calm them and gather information on the conflict. The disputants are then
brought together for a group meeting in step eight (Tuso 2000).
14The quoted phrases are taken from Fisher and Ury (1991). Although they were
writing about negotiation, their problem-solving, integrative approach has profoundly
influenced North American mediation praxis. Fisher and Ury's tenets were central
components of most of the mediation training programs that I have participated in, for
example. The mediation training of the author stressed many of Fisher and Ury's tenets.
15There are significant differences between theoretical and academic mediation
guidelines and the world of praxis. For example, although the prescriptive literature is
dominated by the facilitative paradigm, many practicing mediators have been trained as
attorneys and bring an evaluative approach to the field.
16These phrases are taken from interviews and were used quite frequently.
171nterestingly the observed variation was opposite of that described by Picard
(2002) and others in North America where women tend to be more facilitative broad in style
than men. In Gambia it is the opposite at least in terms of the facilitative - evaluative pole.
Female mediators also seem less likely to mediate without group meetings in disputes
between other women.
18A US study in which mediators were given checklists of activities to fill out
immediately after they ended a mediation session revealed significant discrepancies with a
comparison to the empirical data on those mediations (Kresse! and Pruitt 1989a). Clearly,
descriptive data should be approached with some caution (Bernard and othersl984).
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CULTURE, RHETORIC AND RECONCILIATION:
THE PLACE OF LANGUAGE IN THE NORTHERN IRISH CONFLICT
AND PEACE PROCESS
(1998 - 2002)

Jennifer M. Dougherty

Abstract

Alterations in public discourse towards multiculturalism, reconciliation and liberal
democracy at the national level in Northern Ireland are evident from 1998 - 2002,
but to what end? To what extent did language play a positive role in the Northern
Ireland peace process? Recognizing that language does not tell the whole story of
the Northern Irish experience of the Troubles or current peace process, the author
highlights how language, as a transmitter and constitutor of culture, has played a
role as a signifier of potential conflict, peace and progress (or lack thereof). In
particular, the author considers several texts including excerpts from speeches
given by Noble Prize Winners-the former First Minister David Trimble and former
SDLP leader, John Hume; an IRA apology, Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the Belfast
Agreement; and several selections from the work of Northern Irish poets Seamus
Heaney and Eavan Boland.
Overview: The Changing Landscape of Language

In Northern Ireland, the use of language is governed as much by rules of
grammar, as by etiquette, social identity, and norms informed by culture. By
indicating one's mailing address, primary school, or family name, one is likely to
have signified (intentionally or not) more than geography or genealogy; that is,
political, religious, or social affiliations can be deduced from simple conversational
elements. Poet laureate, Seamus Heaney (1990) aptly captures this unique form of
cultural communication: "Manoeuverings to find out name and school,/Subtle
discrimination by addresses/With hardly an exception to the rule/That Norman, Ken
and Sidney signaled Prod/ And Seamus (call me Sean) was sure-fire Pape,/0 land of
password, handgrip, wink and nod,/ Of open minds as open as a trap" (Heaney,
1990, p. 92). The subtlety of sectarian communication can reinforce communal
divides and under gird the reproduction of culture in Northern Ireland-but the
landscape of language, on the surface, appears to be changing.
Dunn and Dawson (2000) reason that " .. .language in Northern Ireland is in
a constant state of change and evolution: words move around ... names of places
become symbolic; phrases become part of history; meanings are refined again and
again" (Dunn & Dawson, 2000, p. xviii). Beyond being a continually changing
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selection process, involving the choice of certain names or labels over others, the
use of language constitutes and regulates the specific cultural setting in which
individuals feel, or are perceived, to be a part. Language indeed has held a
provocative place in the history of Northern Ireland, at times specifying the cultural
boundaries of a region where the Irish language is spoken, or solidifying group
identity through the use of slang about the "other." As such, language has played
and continues to play an integral part of the cultural narrative (re) construction,
leaving an indelible mark upon the socio-political landscape of Northern Ireland,
evidenced in the Agreement' and other "public texts" (that is, those which are
written, spoken, or meant to be read aloud).
Beyond literal linguistic differences, the selection and arrangement of
terms, symbols, and metaphors plays a part in how cultural messages are created
and transmitted, as well as in how the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland
are understood. The stories that are told may become shared and comprise part of
the cultural narrative, which informs the path that peace may take. Not everyone has
equal access to the media or public at-large, however, so some stories dominate.
Additionally, in contexts of conflict, cultural narratives often compete. Alterations
in public "discourse"2 at the national, political level was demonstrated by the use of
rhetoric associated with reconciliation, pluralism, and multiculturalism, as the peace
process drew on and yet examination of public texts reveals that competing cultural
narratives persisted.
This raises several questions: Is the macro-discourse actually changing or
are the same messages being transmitted despite the choice of new words? Is an
increased use of "conflict resolution" language and "rhetoric of reconciliation"
necessary and sufficient to bring about a positive and peaceful cultural change? It is
my contention that divisive cultural narratives, constituted by partisan, sectarian, or
parochial rhetoric and subtle "othering," remain despite best intentions to equalize
or neutralize the contentious cultural narratives which have occupied the Northern
Irish cultural landscape. Heaney implies these subtle advances of "othering" in
inter-cultural settings, "Smoke-signals are loud-mouthed with us" (Heaney, 1990, p.
92). That is, the inter-subjective meaning of certain symbols, metaphors, and words
are deeply rooted within Northern Ireland and may not be as easily discerned by the
outsider, transformed by parties to a conflict, nor easily extracted from their cultural
roots by lithe politicians.
To delve deeper into the connections among culture, rhetoric, and
reconciliation, it is first necessary to illustrate the conceptual framework that guides
this article. Recognizing the vastness of literature related to culture and conflict
resolution, I will offer the reader a brief literature review of pertinent works. Next, I
will highlight the intersection of culture, language and conflict
resolution/transformation before turning my attention to a discussion of cultural
narrative. Having illustrated the conceptual framework for this article, I return to
consider the Northern Ireland context and explore several "public texts." These texts
include excerpts from speeches given by former First Minister David Trimble and
former SDLP leader, John Hume; an IRA "apology;" the Agreement; and the
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Bloody Sunday Inquiry, incorporating selections from the work of Northern Irish
poets, Seamus Heaney and Eavan Boland where illustrative. I will close the article
by considering the implications of this article for ethnopolitical conflict analysis and
resolution.
Culture & Conflict: A Brief Literature Review

In the forward of Avruch' s (1998) Culture & Conflict Resolution, thenpresident of the United States Institute of Peace, Richard Solomon commented that
while there is widespread agreement among researchers and practitioners alike that
"culture matters," the translation of this postulate presents intellectual difficulties.
Namely, "Yes, culture matters, but what exactly do we mean by 'culture' in the
context of conflict resolution, and how should cultural elements be dealt with?"
(Avruch, 1998, p. ix). Some researchers have treated "culture" as a variable in line
with sex, age, or another quantifiable demographic indicator. Others treat "culture"
as an inescapable-and un-resolvable-source of conflict, concluding that being
different from another is basically the same as being in conflict with 3 them (see
Huntington's (1993) "Clash of Civilizations"4 for a lucid example of this).
Predominantly, theorists have viewed "culture" as a relatively static
complex of curious behaviors which are passed on and inherited evenly by members
of an (ethnically, linguistically, racially) homogeneous group, and thus seek to
create categories into which cultural groups can carefully fit. This introduces us to
an important orientational distinction among researchers; namely, speculation about
where culture comes from and where it goes. On the one hand, there are those who
generalize culture as being more-or-less evenly diffused and passively or
unconsciously inherited by members of a population from somewhere outside of
themselves (Hall 1977, Huntington 1993, and Weaver 1998). On the other hand,
there are those who view members of a group as knowledgeable, active, and deeply
implicated in the co-creation, adaptation, transmission, and enactment of cultural
beliefs, values, and practices (Avruch 1998, Cohen 1999, and Ting-Toomey 1999).
To illustrate this distinction, consider Hall's (1977) high and low context5 typology.
Specifying communication practices that he observed in a variety of settings, Hall
and subsequent theorists have seen fit to carve up a diverse and complex social
landscape into a dichotomous world. More recently, Weaver (1998) echoes Hall's
approach by developing a continuum along which he places "cultures" so as to
highlight their differences 6. Admittedly, such generalities provide the curious with
ease when drawing comparisons among groups. However, in others' estimationmyself included-preserving complexity and nuance are at least as important as
comparative ease (Lederach 2005, Avruch 1998). Avruch (1998) differs from the
theorists mentioned above, viewing culture as being not necessarily evenly diffused,
and finding that individuals may be possessed of multiple cultures (religious,
organizational, national, and so on) to varying degrees. Avruch additionally argues
that culture should not be conceived of as "timeless" and that one can not gain an
adequate understanding of culture simply by observing the enactment of "custom"
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(Avruch, 1998, pp. 15-16). Significantly, Avruch links culture and individuals in a
mutually adaptive relationship, showing how individuals' social and cognitive
processes ensure the fluidity of culture.
Cohen (1999) shares Avruch's conception of culture, writing that it "is not
something tangible, a 'thing'; it is not a commodity possessed uniformly by every
member of a community, nor is it a set of quaint customs to be learned before a trip
abroad" (Cohen, 1999, p. 12). Further, Cohen argues for a powerful, deterministic
role of culture saying, "culture permits community, because without it
co~unication, coordinated activity, social life itself, would be impossible"
(Cohen, 1999, p. 12). For Cohen (1999), "language is pivotal to cultural identity,
since it acts as the communal archive and conveyor belt by which shared meanings
are stored and transmitted within human groups down the years from one generation
to the next" (Cohen, 1999, p.13). Following this train of thought leads us to a better
understanding of continuity and how cultures are preserved. To understand how
cultural change occurs, we need other conceptual tools to answer the question: If
cultures are not fixed, how and wherefore are they transformed?
Rather than viewing language as a deterministic cultural influence and
currency of exchange within a social structure, structurationist views (Giddens
1984, Jabri 1996) remind us that individuals may be both constrained and enabled
by their social structure. Since, according to this viewpoint, there is a reflexive
relationship between the two, social change-initiated by actors-is a distinct
possibility. Social constructionist views offer another useful understanding.
Building on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 7, Ting-Toomey (1999) finds that language
has a transformational ability at the cultural level because, "While the language of a
culture perpetuates that culture's traditions, by changing our language habits we can
incrementally transform long-standing cultural norms and attitudes" (Ting-Toomey,
1999, pp. 98-99). Further, she finds that intentionally changing "linguistic habits"
leads to transformation in "our thinking patterns" as well as to how we relate to
different identity groups (Ibid). Where misperceptions, attributional distortion,
dehumanization, and group polarization are common features of social conflict,
mindful transformations in cultural narrative can create space for peaceful social
change. This paper offers one perspective of why when there was a political process
that led to a peace agreement that this process did not bring about peace. Namely,
despite parties' best efforts to do so, the language of reconciliation was not yet
common currency, imbued with shared meaning, and embedded in a common
cultural narrative.
A vruch ( 1991) emphasizes the "necessity to place conflict and conflict
resolution processes in a larger sociocultural context and not isolate them from the
encompassing worlds-of-meaning in which, in ongoing ways, they remain
embedded" (A vruch, 1991, pp. 14-15). Intrigued by the nexus of language, culture,
conflict, and conflict resolution, some authors (White 1991, Lederach 1991, and
Black 1991) have attempted to examine how parties to a conflict construct and
make sense of their social realities (including conflict behaviors, possibilities for
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Like other pliable concepts, "narrative" has proven useful to a variety of
disciplines. In literature, narrative approaches are designed with the intent of
offering a credible source for the tale about to be told. The type of narrator selected
can draw the audience closer to the author's mind (think of Virginia Woolfs A
Room of One's Own) or distance the reader from the author (recall Joseph Conrad's
Heart of Darkness). In the field of psychology, Schafer (1981) introduced the
concept of narrative into psychoanalytic discourse. In peace and conflict studies,
narrative has been used as a tool of analysts (See Cobb and Rifkin (1991) for
example of narrative analysis) and of practitioners (See Winslade and Monk (2000)
for example of narrative mediation).
Broadly defined, narrative is a tool for organizing and interpreting
experience (Hodgson, 1999). Cultural narrative construction is a sense-making
activity: that is, taking new phenomenon or events of the past then (re)framing
according to cultural assumptions in order to render those experiences intelligible or
understandable in local context which previously had been disordered or incoherent.
Carr (1986) views individuals as highly active in cultural narrative formation, "We
cast ourselves in an unfolding story and act it out, and because we choose the story
and our role in it, we can switch stories at any time" (Stewart et al, 2001, p. 249).
Black (1991) observes, "We bring order to that stream [of interaction and
experiences] by selecting 'events' that can be linked together in culturally
appropriate ways. We make sense of, and in, the social world in which we are so
inescapably embedded by creating such narratives" (Black, 1991, p. 161).
Synthesizing the aforementioned ideas, cultural narrative can be seen to provide the
fulcrum for cultural change and continuity.
Cultural narrative may take the form of story telling or myth-making. Oral
history is one way cultural narratives are intentionally passed on using events,
metaphor, myth, tone, rhetoric, and other storytelling devices to capture the
attention of the audience, to suspend the disbelief of listeners, and to gamer fidelity
to the author's particular, internally coherent view of the past8• But oral history is
not the only way cultural narratives are created and transmitted. Indeed, cultural
narrative need not be constructed in verbal or written forms alone. The use of
symbolic action, rituals, and/or gestures also convey (however indirectly) powerful
messages, potentially influencing the path of conflict processes and providing
transformational moments in peace processes (Schirch 2005, Mitchell 2000,
Kreis burg 2003). For example, in his study of the peace process in Northern Ireland,
Pruitt (in press) points to a "benevolent circle" brought about by "gestures of
conciliation" (Mitchell, 2000) that interrupted the "conflict spiral that so often
underlies the escalation of conflict" (Pruitt, in press, p. 6, Pruitt and Kim 2004). In
such a manner, both verbal and nonverbal messages may become inscribed in
collective memory and thus constitutive of cultural narrative.
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Why narrative matters in terms of conflict resolution is because it is
uniquely situated to change the perceptions of parties to the conflict. Cheldelin and
Lyons (2003) explain, "narrative strategies change the ways members of a group see
themselves in their particular conflict, allowing group members to consider new
possibilities for resolution. Thus, the social contexts that influence conflict--often
macro-level issues such as culture, race, gender, and class-are important parts of
the stories" (Cheldelin and Lyons, 2003, p.261). Tracing cultural narratives during
episodes of violent or protracted conflict also reminds us of the role various
narrators can and do (intentionally or otherwise) play in cultural change and
continuity. While all individuals possess capacity to collude in this process, not all
are able to do so to the same degree. That is, top level leadership (heads of
government, media moguls, captains of industry) are often powerfully situated (due
to greater access to allocative and authoritative resources) to generate, develop,
control, and diffuse narratives more so than, for example, the disenfranchised,
marginalized members of grassroots communities. With this in mind, the bulk of the
texts I will discuss have been extracted from the published speeches and interviews
of the politicians uniquely situated to have influenced the Northern Irish peace
process in the years 1998 - 2002.
Rhetoric, Metaphor & Subtle "Othering"9

The practice of appropriating historical events, popular culture, biblical
metaphors, and conflict resolution terminology out of particular context for use as
rhetoric is a common practice. Rich with innuendo and ripe for personal or
communal associations, it gives the speaker the opportunity to create a context in
the presence of a collective body of listeners without having to claim personal
responsibility for or authorship of events, ideas, and concepts that predate her or
him. Picking and choosing among pregnant and emotive images from the past
provide a public speaker with persuasive rhetorical tools. Elaborating on the
function of rhetoric, Buckley ( 1995) writes, "Rhetoric also provides the occasion for
social interaction. Statements about the nature of the world occur in interactions that
define the identity of participants" (Buckley, 1995, p. 211). Such speech acts,
gleaning the maximum utility of culturally or historically loaded terms, are part of
the creative cultural - and political - process.
As Dunn and Dawson (2000) point out, "The experience of Northern
Ireland indicates that endemic social separation, division, and antagonism ensures
that political language takes on locally-characteristic meanings, with finely-wrought
distinctions, and that these mutations derive from the stresses and struggles of
conflict" (Dunn and Dawson, 2000, p. xxii). Thus, one may appropriate biblical
metaphors, manipulate historical narratives, or conjure new terminology to speak of
old concepts, believing one's audience incapable of catching the scent of
propaganda. However, because cultural identity has so frequently been used as a
tool for political gain in Northern Ireland, listeners may be even more sensitized to
or critical of the use of what might be perceived as much less loaded (or at least
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much smaller) terms-our, we, us, them, they. Heaney (1990) echoes this suspicion,
"Expertly civil-tongued with civil neighbours/On the high wires of first wireless
reports/Sucking the fake taste, the stony flavours/Of those sanctioned, old, elaborate
retorts" (Heaney, 1990, p. 91).
As part of a particularistic, cultural collectivity, individuals are encouraged
to identify with their own group members while identifying the "other." Riggins
(1997) remarks, "For a person to develop a self-identity, he or she must generate
discourses of both difference and similarity and must reject and embrace specific
identities" (Riggins, 1997, p. 4). If we apply Riggins concept of social identity
formation to the communities within Northern Ireland, we may see that the process
of selection among identities available is one that is grafted with historical
narratives and everyday conversations which define and refine self and "other." As
Dawson and Dunn (2000) point out, "One of the many social aspects of nearly thirty
years of violence in Northern Ireland has been the creation of a new, indigenous,
political vocabulary involving an almost continual invention and reinvention of
language" (Dunn and Dawson, 2000, p. xvii). With the Agreement in place,
movement towards a more peaceful and cohesive liberal democratic society which
values its multicultural heritage (in letter and spirit of the words recorded in the
Agreement) may seem to be more likely. However, simply altering discourse at the
national level and speaking the language of tolerance, multiculturalism and so forth
(without addressing real injustices which remain) may be seen as equivalent to a
cosmetic lift, and not necessarily the sea change that some had hoped the
Agreement signaled. In the next section I will briefly familiarize the reader with the
origins of the Northern Ireland peace process before turning to consider the
Agreement.
Pre-Agreement Peace Process
Although some designate the acceptance of the Agreement by referendum
in May 1998 as the starting point of the peace process in Northern Ireland, a quick
survey of its history reveals that the groundwork had begun to be laid much earlier
with the work of various peace groups and initiatives. As Martin Mansergh (2003)
points out, more than high profile political actors and perhaps paramilitaries, "the
overwhelming public desire for peace in both Northern Ireland and the Republic
was perhaps the most critical factor of all. It had been consistently displayed over a
long period and reflected a great deal of valuable and unsung work for peace by
countless individuals and organizations" (Mansergh, 2003, p. 1). While the AngloIrish Agreement (AIA) failed to secure a power-sharing arrangement in 1985, the
existence of AIA prompted further thought and discussion of what a mutually
satisfactory arrangement might look like for the people of Northern Ireland and the
political parties who claim to represent them. As Pruitt suggests, "While technically
not a part of the peace process, the Anglo-Irish Agreement changed the political
landscape in a way that ushered in the peace process" (Pruitt, in press, p. 4).
Additionally, international examples of seemingly intractable conflicts
being solved via peaceful and political means (the Velvet Revolution in Prague, the
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fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany, the transition to majority rule in South Africa)
provided models of what might be possible in terms of a peace process for Northern
Ireland. With the creation of the Downing Street Declaration in 1993 and with thenU.S. President Bill Clinton serving as guarantor for peace in Northern Ireland, the
early stages of the peace process gathered momentum. While the August 1994
cease-fire declared by the IRA later faltered (culminating in the February 1996
Canary Wharf bombing, which was subsequently followed by an additional
ceasefire in 1997), at the time, their declaration arguably occasioned the UDF/UDA
cessation of violence.
Cumulatively, these events buoyed hopes for peace and enabled a
subsequent political process to unfold in place of armed struggle. Against this
historical backdrop, the multi-party talks ensued, culminating in the Agreement.
Notably, this peace process ensued first unofficially through back channels (for
example, Pruitt reminds, "in late 1990, British Intelligence communicated, through
a chain of intermediaries, with Martin McGuiness, Adams' deputy, to explore Sinn
Fein's interest in negotiating a settlement" (Pruitt, in press, p. 5). Then the peace
process officially emerged with published documents (such as Sinn Fein's "Toward
a Lasting Peace" which recognized for the first time the necessity of unionist
consent if a united Ireland was to be realized), dialogue, and peace talks among the
vested political parties.

,;
I

The Agreement
A reading of the Agreement reveals that the fluidity of language can pose
problems to and hold promise for the development of peace. That is, the
malleability of language enabled the Agreement to come into existence. However,
its ambiguousness may ultimately (passively) support continued communal division
in the implementation phase. Reflecting on how skeptical readers of the Agreement
would interpret its text, Ruane (1999) remarks, "Each party sold the Agreement to
its supporters on the basis that their fundamental concerns had been, and would be,
met" (Ruane, 1999, p. 164). Because of the fundamental contradictions embedded
in the Agreement and the political discourse that has emanated from it, some readers
are pessimistic about the prospects for lasting peace under the aegis of the
Agreement. Ruane summarizes this position, "Those unionists who supported the
Agreement did so to achieve the end of the IRA' s campaign and to secure the union.
The nationalists and republicans who supported it did so to achieve equality and
closer links with the South while advancing the process of Irish reunification in the
longer term. The difficulty with the Agreement is that it does not-cannot-deliver
all of these simultaneously" (Ruane, 1999, p. 163). Dunn & Dawson (2000) also
point out that such discrepancies are inescapable because, " . .. in Northern Ireland
words can ... allow for a degree of necessary confusion and ambiguity, since the
view and aspirations of the two communities often appear to be so irretrievably
opposed as to make discussion possible only when hard lines are fudged" (Dunn &
Dawson, 2000, p. xvii).
Rife with contradictions as the Agreement may seem and as valid as the
aforementioned criticisms may be, there are clauses that seek to validate the various
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identity and cultural groups in Northern Ireland. For example, Section I (vi) of the
Agreement states that the participants recognized the "birthright of all the people of
Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both,
as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British
and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by
any future change in the status of Northern Ireland" (in Ruane and Todd, 1999, p.
172). Article 2 of Annex B states, "It is the entitlement and birthright of every
person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of
the Irish nation" (in Ruane and Todd, 1999, 174). From the foundation of human
rights, self-determination (as far as identity selection goes), and equality, the
Agreement has explicitly laid the foundation for a modern liberal democracy in this
regard. Yet, although the Agreement may be seen as the advent of peace and
safeguard of culture communities, sectarianism, violence, and mistrust remain, as
indicated by greater polarization in politics and increased segregation in housing
and education since 1998 when the Agreement came into being.
Part of the reason for this problematic juxtaposition may be explained by
considering who the parties to the conflict have been and who was involved in the
creation of the Agreement. That is, the conflict has been carried out at multiple
levels (national, communal, interpersonal), using a variety of methods (violence,
debate, collaboration, silence), by a variety of parties (politicians, paramilitaries,
community members, and so on) but the Agreement was formulated, pitched, and
sold by political elites. Ruane (1999) points out that the greatest promise of the
Agreement rests in those men and women who hammered it out (Ruane, 1999, p.
163). Ironically, and perhaps unfortunately, those parties directly involved in the
drafting of the Agreement are not currently involved in its implementation (or lack
thereof): in May 2005, David Trimble lost the election in his home district and
subsequently lost the mandate of his party and John Hume has since stepped out of
party politics, while the far extremes-the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) lead
by Ian Paisley and Sinn Fein lead by Gerry Adams-emerged victorious in the May
2005 elections. Although the language of equality may be attractive and sonorous to
some constituents' ears, it may be less "intelligible" and offer less motivation than
the wordsmiths, who rely on such discourse, intended because their constituents'
cultural identities are so intertwined with their particularistic life experiencescreating competing cultural narratives (Bridges 1994). Stewart et al. trace the
impact of competing cultural narratives, "If history is the creation of explanatory
stories, and if communities form around their stories, then some of these narrative
groups must inevitably conflict" (Stewart et al, 2001 , p. 250). A further reason for a
lack of intelligibility or motivation may be that individuals have grown tired of
rhetoric and are skeptical that positive social change is possible after the passage of
so much time. Indeed, the current post-Agreement phase has seen several years of
devolved government (that is, governance is managed from Westminster) and local
politics have become further polarized.

Cultural Artifacts of Language
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Examining public texts can reveal a shift in the tide of political and public
opinion if we consider that these texts are social constructions or representations of
reality, which is interpreted, framed, and then shared by a narrator with an audience.
As Riggins ( 1997) points out, discourse is more properly thought of as "artifacts of
language through which the very reality they purport to reflect is constructed" and
not reality itself (Riggins, 1997, p. 2). In Northern Ireland, as Buckley ( 1995) points
out, "historical accounts ... uphold the interests of one group against the other by
describing past events in a well-selected frame. [This] framing of the information
is ... partially structured by a common set of metaphors of invasion and siege"
(Buckley, 1995, p. 42). Expressing his frustration at and recognition of the use of
the siege of Londonderry as rhetorical fodder for narrative advanced by politicians,
Heaney writes, "Where tongues lie coiled, as under flames lie wicks,/Where half of
us, as in a wooded horse,/Were cabin' d and confined like wily Greeks,/Beseiged
within the siege, whispering morse" (Heaney, 1990, p. 92). The perception of being
"under siege" is a common facet in cultural narratives in Northern Ireland and is
evidenced in film, poetry, interviews, speeches, and so on.
The widely recognized concept, "siege mentality", when used in the
Northern Irish context, may be used to describe the Protestants' fear of
encroachment by the Catholic population and to commemorate the siege of
Londonderry. However, it may also be used to in the nationalist account of the
Plantation period. Cuchulainn, an Irish, prehistoric, mythological figure has
traditionally been seen in Nationalist cultural representations (murals, poetry, song,
and so on), but he has more recently been used as a subject in loyalist murals and
portrayed as a hero of Ulster (Dawson and Dunn, 2000, p. 66). Figures from
mythology or events from history may be re-interpreted, dislocated from one
group's narrative and subsumed into another. It may also be used as a form of
sectarianism to mobilize groups; this process can be divisive and destructive. The
Northern Irish poet, Eavan Boland seems to lament the subversion of myth and
metaphor in "What We Lost," "The dumb-show of legend has become language,/is
becoming silence and who will know that once/words were possibilities and
disappointments" (Haberstroh, 1996, p. 83). However, reinterpretation or
reconstruction need not be negative. For example, in April 2006, Northern Ireland's
social development minister announced that one million pounds would be allocated
to paint over violent sectarian murals with less loaded, more "decorous" murals.
Something creative and constructive such as this mural initiative, or other
"greening" activities, may inscribe the social and geographical landscape with
mutually affirming images and ideas to replace the old glorified visions of sectarian
figures and violent acts. However, as The Economist is quick to point out "whether
anybody dares take up the offer [of painting over other murals] without the
perrmss10n of the paramilitaries is another matter" (The Economist
2006) . .. reminding us that not everyone is equally powerful (or intimidating) when
it comes to modifying elements of narrative.
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Along with the appropriation of historical events and mythological figures,
the use of the same biblical metaphors, or language of religiosity has been used
recently by Unionists and Nationalists alike. In this Christian context, biblical texts
provide the opportunity to see similarities with other great sufferers or heroes much
in the same way that the Qur 'an might do in an Islamic context. It can enhance
one's sense of self and typify the sense of other according to the biblical or religious
metaphor selected. For example, consider Seamus Mallon (SDLP) who referred to
the Agreement as a "covenant" rather than a legally binding document. He may
have intended to connote the cultural Christian commonality of the parties to the
Agreement rather than a social contract among mere citizens (Arthur 2002). These
occurrences do not necessarily seem to indicate a definitive shift in culture or an
absolute synthesis of the cultural traditions in Northern Ireland (I do not foresee a
green, white and orange Union Jack flag or colorless curbstones in the near future).
Rather, in keeping with the concept that culture is a fluid, dynamic, and changing,
such metaphor use seems to indicate a reinvention and refining of cultural narratives
rather than a hybridization leading to a "Northern Irish" narrative (although some
politicians have advocated a "civic nationalism" 10 to supplant ethnic nationalism).
Several questions may here unfold: At what depth does this (re)construction of
cultural narrative take place? Who is involved in this process? And what are
perceived to be the costs for particular cultural traditions? As will be discussed later
in this paper, for residents of Ardoyne and witnesses of Bloody Sunday, competing
narratives exist at multiple levels and reveal that costs are high.

"Rhetoric of Reconciliation" 11
"Zero sum" situations and "win-win" solutions have come to constitute
popular conflict resolution rhetoric used by people in many settings to communicate
the desirability of one outcome over another. For example, Lord Smith (2000)
writes, "There are .. .long-standing themes in the Northern Ireland situation that have
been allowed to shape and determine the apparently intransigent, 'zero-sum'
posturings that masquerade as politics, and manage to inhibit or even prohibit
progression to a more lasting, peaceful and democratic alternatives" (Lord Smith
2000). In his Nobel Peace Prize lecture, John Hume remarked that both sides need
to respect each other so that "there will be no victory for either side" (intended to
sound magnanimous and to discourage triumphalism, what Hume describes here
actually sounds like a "lose-lose" situation) (Grant, 2001, p. 138). Arthur Aughey
( 1999) identified an additional phrase borrowed from conflict resolution theory that
has become part of the discourse since the Agreement: "confidence building
measures" (Aughey, 1999, p. 122). What effect might such rhetoric have?
The tendency towards using such language reinforces the attempt to fuse a
meta-culture (namely, civic culture) and create a macro-discourse (in the Focualtian
sense) in Northern Ireland which embraces modem liberal democratic concepts
(equality and freedom), attempting a shift towards peace and harmony. Aughey
(1999) describes this as a move towards political civility, which "involves a style of
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politics which acknowledges difference and diversity but also acknowledges a
common interest beyond difference and diversity" (Aughey, 1999, p. 123). Metaculture creation is fostered by elocutionary acts in the realm of politics; as such, it is
an inorganic construct, manufactured by political elites who see the utility of
language associated with multiculturalism, pluralism, and democracy more so than
the intrinsic value of those ideals to the people whom they represent.
Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism is part and parcel of liberal democratic ideology;
"transferred to the North of Ireland, the liberal approach came to be seen as a
solution to the deep-rooted sectarian divisions of the society" (Rolston, 1998, p.
254). The underlying assumptions associated with multiculturalism and the model
of modem liberal democratic discourse seems to be something like this: if we use
the words "equality," "diversity," "mutual respect," "tolerance," and so on, then the
interlocutors will hear and internalize these concepts such that our macro-discourse
will change the micro-discourse for the better. This may be very presumptuous
since some individuals may not be listening that closely to political elites for a
variety of reasons. For example, elites may have not represented their interests in
the past; or perhaps they used to represent their interests but are now "sleeping with
the enemy." Individuals may be apathetic (perhaps understandably so) and/or are
not only war-weary, but Agreement-weary because the peace process has been slow
to unfold and to deliver on the promises people perceived it would herald. McGarry
(2001) also points out, "appeals that are made in civic language are often seen by
the targeted minority as ethnocentrism in politically correct garb, an impression that
is not always correct, but often is" (McGarry, 2001, p. 127). An excerpt from
Heaney's Whatever You Say Say Nothing echoes McGarry's recognition of
individuals' distaste for thinly-veiled political or journalistic jargon: "But I incline
as much to rosary beads/As to the jottings and analyses/Of politicians and
newspapermen ... Who proved upon their pulses 'escalate,'/'Backlash' and 'crackdown,' 'the provisional wing,'/ 'Polarization' and 'long standing hate'" (Heaney,
1990, p. 91).
The use of buzzwords and phrases as those mentioned above may be
perceived to embody an earnest attempt to ensure harmony and/or show an
appreciation for the cultural heritages of Northern Ireland. But glossing over the
competing narratives in operation within communities may have the effect of
denying their potent, particularistic values and experiences. Such a macro-discourse
may have the unintended (or intended) effect of smoothing over past wrongdoing
and feelings of humiliation in pursuit of peace. In doing so, the speaker, using the
rhetoric of reconciliation, conflict resolution and multiculturalism, may seek to
alleviate the pressure upon the community she or he represents to answer for past
injustices. The July 16, 2002 IRA apology to the families of those victims of
paramilitary violence offers a vivid example of either earnest contrition or political
maneuvering (or, perhaps, a bit of both): "While it was not our intention to injure or
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kill non-combatants, the reality is that on this and on a number of other occasions,
that was the consequence of our actions ... We offer our sincere apologies and
condolences to their families ... We also acknowledge the grief and pain of their
relatives" (BBC News, July 16, 2002).
Reporting for BBC News, Kevin Connolly reports the apology may have
been meant in earnest, the families of the victims are right to view it with
skepticism. While the apology may indeed be sincere, forgiveness is not automatic.
Also, the IRA was speaking to at least two different audiences (old enemies and
Republican supporters) at a variety of levels (local, national and international) and
thus likely sending multiple (both intended and unintended) messages. The response
to the apology is likewise varied. Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahem remarked,
"Today's statement by the IRA is a significant contribution to the process of
consolidating peace and reconciliation" (BBC News, July 17, 2002). Another man,
whose son was killed by the IRA remarked: "In truth, it offers no comfort ... That
said, I am as active in the peace process as a private individual can be, and from that
perspective, I appreciate what they are doing" (Ibid). Despite the public apology the
IRA offered and its movement towards disbanding in recent years, Murray (2002)
reminds his readers while the IRA may be moving in this direction, "it can't say that
for its grass roots yet" (BBC News, July 17, 2002). Recall the definition of cultural
narrative offered earlier in this paper. The IRA apology is one of the "new
phenomenon" people attempt to make sense of, framing it in terms of their cultural
beliefs. The case of the Ardoyne conflict highlights the active contestation among
narratives.
Ardoyne
Although conflict in this area is not a new phenomenon, international
visibility in the press was. From June 2001 through January 2002, some of the
Protestant members of the Ardoyne community insisted that Catholic adults,
accompanying their children to the Holy Cross school, were using their children as
cover so they (the IRA) could "case" their homes and plan organized attacks. The
Catholic members of the community insisted that they should not have to take their
children in the back door of the school. Both groups' concerns were rights-based
(one community asserts its right to protect itself, while the other community insists
that their freedom of movement and their children's right to education in a safe
environment trumps the other communities' concerns). And both objections were
deeply effected by the community members' sense of fear and a pool of unmet
needs.
The local narrative of the trigger incident for this lengthy protest involves a
Catholic taxi driver running into the stepladder that a Protestant baker was standing
on. The driver was on his way to the Holy Cross school. The baker was hanging a
British flag. Sennott (2001) writes "This story ... is to Protestants along this bitterly
divided road a potent image for members of a community who feel that all they hold
dear is being kicked out from under them" (Sennott, 2001, p. 1). Note the siege
mentality here. The narrative at the national and international level at the time
reflected quite a different story. That is, by and large the political leaders and
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international press alike decreed that the events were evidential of "loyalist bigotry"
and hatred and as such condemned the protests outright ... without considering what
the events meant to the individuals who experienced them or what the underlying
grievances might be. They urged a peaceful and swift solution to the conflict as
criticism from abroad mounted. For example, NIO Security Minister, Jane Kennedy
said, "The eyes of the world are, once again, looking at the situation here. Nobody
can understand what is going on here. How can subjecting four-year-old children to
such verbal and physical abuse possibly advance the cause of a community that has
a grievance?" (Tanney 2001 ).
However, as suggested by community leaders such as Anne Bill of the
Concerned Residents of Upper Ardoyne, the residents did not intend to traumatize
the Holy Cross children through their protest. Their actions, according to Bill were
justified and gave voice to deep insecurity and frustration: "Community relations
throughout all of Northern Ireland took a step backward because Protestants felt
they weren't getting a fair deal under the Good Friday Agreement" (Heatley, 2004,
p. 1). Unwilling or unable to address the underlying issues which gave rise to the
conflict at the outset, leaders at the national level relied on mixture of blame-placing
and black-and-white rhetoric. N.I. Secretary, John Reid gives an example: "It is
time politicians in Northern Ireland pointed the finger at those who are guilty of
throwing pipe bombs or intimidating children or parents"(Breen and Smyth 2001).
Meanwhile, community leaders, a mediation network, and concerned residents
embarked on the tedious, grassroots work of reconciling with their neighbors.
[Interestingly, Holy Cross, a recent, fictional film based on the Ardoyne conflict,
was designed to draw attention to "the problems and issues facing these
communities reflect issues facing the wider community in Northern Ireland ...Ho/y
Cross sees the dispute through the eyes of two fictional families and provides an
insight into the actions and emotions of those involved on both sides - an insight
which goes beyond the blunt images of hatred and anger shown in the news reports
of the time" (BBC News Online).] Because of its troubled and tenuous ·existence, the
Ardoyne conflict in particular offers us an important reminder that while a peace
agreement may fill the political vacuum at the national level, confidence, trust, and
fellowship are largely lacking from the text of the everyday lives of those coexisting at such flashpoints.

Walking the Talk?
The Troubles have confronted (and continue to confront) the lowereconomic class that occupies interface communities more so than the suburban,
cosmopolitan upper-middle class (Bennett 1998). In a representative democracy,
elected officials who remain incapable of understanding and communicating the
importance of what may be perceived by their constituency as idiosyncratic,
particularistic, and intensely personal narratives and experiences, run the risk of
alienating their constituents (and quite possibly, of not being elected again). As
Ruane ( 1999) points out that while "party leaders on both sides might discover a

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 1
- 56 -

common inte1
stability ... thei
support does o
p. 164). The _
DUP and Siu
disillusionmen
largely respon
Free (
however is no1
the lingering c
elites are not a
and see their
concepts so as
such discour.
representative:
tolerance, and
through a lacl
cultures, multi
"peace" entail
support a mor
Ireland Assem
When
to designate 1
stipulates that
unionist and Ii
as either nati
"cross-commu
perhaps uninte
Alliance Partv
the same valm
party remarke1
the vote to el
Mallon as De;
did not count 1
that the votes
community c
Such
Informants \H
an identity \ H
information; f
apt. David F
positive signs.
some 250,000
shame is that

Culture Rhetoric and Reconciliation

loyalist bigotry"
onsidering what
t the underlying
1 the conflict as
r, Jane Kennedy
m here. Nobody
r-old children to
rnmnity that has
Jllle Bill of the
!ld to traumatize
ling to Bill were
munity relations
Protestants felt
(Heatley, 2004,
gave rise to the
)f blame-placing
example: "It is
ho are guilty of
1d Smyth 2001 ).
cerned residents
their neighbors.
.rdoyne conflict,
!s facing these
m Ireland ...Holy
and provides an
ides - an insight
Ihe news reports
,us existence, the
at while a peace
dence, trust, and
res of those co-

:ont) the lowerm the suburban,
1tive democracy,
1I1IDunicating the
as idiosyncratic,
, run the risk of
ected again). As
might discover a

common interest in pursuing the conciliatory line in the interests of overall
stability ... their supporters are unlikely to be so indulgent. And if the party they
support does not deliver, they will switch to another one which will" (Ruane, 1999,
p. 164). The May 2005 elections, which saw the victory of both anti-Agreement
DUP and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, speaks to constituencies'
disillusionment with the moderate parties (the UUP and the SDLP) who were
largely responsible for hammering out the Agreement.
Free elections and political representation in a democratic government,
however is not sufficient for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Take, for example,
the lingering conflicts surrounding the Ardoyne Road in Belfast. Of course, political
elites are not all bad (nor all good); they may indeed intend to bring people together
and see their role as one of simplifying complex messages and complicated
concepts so as to usher in a new era of peace. However, the unintended affects of
such discourse may be that constituencies feel alienated from political
representatives who say, on the one hand, that they value multiculturalism,
tolerance, and diversity; but on the other hand, who effectively negate in practicethrough a lack of structural adjustments-the possibility of recognizing multiple
cultures, multiple experiences of the Troubles, and multiple interpretations of what
"peace" entails. Two examples of missing structural adjustments, which would
support a more inclusive, plural, and democratic society can be found in Northern
Ireland Assembly voting procedures and the last census in Northern Ireland.
When operational, the Northern Ireland Assembly members were required
to designate themselves as either unionist or nationalist, since the Agreement
stipulates that all decisions must be made with the agreement of at least half of the
unionist and the nationalist representatives. Essentially, keeping track of members
as either nationalist or unionist is part of the safety measures to ensure that there is
"cross-community" representation and a power-sharing arrangement. However, a
perhaps unintended consequence is then that other parties' votes, such as such as the
Alliance Party and the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, are not weighted with
the same value. On this issue, Allan Leonard, the General Secretary of the Alliance
party remarked, "Indeed, this whole matter came to a head ... November [2001], with
the vote to elect a new pair of First Ministers (Mark Durcan replacing Seamus
Mallon as Deputy First Minister). The first vote failed because the votes of 'others'
did not count towards the cross-community consensus required. (Isn't it a bit ironic
that the votes of a cross-community party don't count in votes that require crosscommunity consensus!)" (Leonard 2001).
Such labeling occurred in the last census in Northern Ireland as well.
Informants were asked to indicate their religious affiliation. For those who did not,
an identity was selected for them based on the name, address, and other personal
information; Heaney's description, "subtle discrimination by addresses" here seems
apt. David Ford, leader of the Alliance Party, recently noted, "there are some
positive signs. In the last census, over 14 per cent of people in Northern Ireland,
some 250,000, did not wish to be put in a communal category," however, "The
shame is that the Government then categorised them against their will as either
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protestant or catholic" (Ford 2003). In the excerpts that follow, the reader will
notice the use of such dichotomous identities in the rhetoric used by then-First
Minister David Trimble and former SDLP leader, John Hume.
"To Raise Up a New Northern Ireland"12

In his speech to Northern Ireland Business and Community Leaders in
1998, then-First Minister David Trimble (1998) remarked, "There is no party that is
wholly outside the political process. We can now get down to the historic and
honorable task of this generation: to raise up a new Northern Ireland in which
pluralist Unionism and constitutional nationalism can speak to each other with the
civility that is the foundation of freedom" (Trimble, 1998, p. 71 ). Although surely
intended to evoke feelings of pride and accomplishment among his fellow
Unionists, Trimble reinforced the traditional binary opposition ("pluralist
Unionism" and "constitutional nationalism") and further defines fault lines by
suggesting through his choice of adjectives that pluralism is a Unionist value while
constitutionalism is a Nationalist value. It is not clear from his speech how
Unionism is actively pluralist, especially since its history shows it to by definition
exclusionary. As Gillian McIntosh (1999) reasons, "The rhetoric of unionism often
spoke of the 'people' and 'everyone,' but it was an exclusive rather than an
inclusive generality" (McIntosh, 1999, p. 221 ). However, one can infer that his
audience understood more deeply this attribution. In sum Trimble delivered the
message-unwittingly or otherwise-that there were only two groups involved in
the peace process ("There is no party that is wholly outside the political process."),
from two different traditions (constitutionalism and pluralism), which will come
together and "speak to each other in civility" (Trimble, 1998, p. 71 ). Beyond
placing great faith in the ability of both sides to communicate clearly and civilly,
Trimble also remarked, "I believe the Union offers all our people the best prospect
of peace and fair play because the Union unites us all into a genuinely plural,
liberal, democratic state capable of accommodating social, cultural, and religious
diversity" (Trimble, 1998, p. 71 ). In seeking to stretch the bounds of Unionism to
cover all other communities, Trimble's goal seems to be that of assimilation (a long
time fear of Catholic/Nationalist communities in Northern Ireland), not pluralism as
he purports.
Although he says that the "Union unites us all into a genuinely plural,
liberal, democratic state ... " this has not been the experience or perception of all
occupants of Northern Ireland. For example, when a Nationalist interlocutor hears
"the Union offers all our people the best prospect of peace ... " this statement may be
interpreted as exclusionary since it is not clear whether "all our people" refers to
other Unionists or the balance of the Northern Irish populace. Although Trimble
may have mindfully chosen the pronouns "we" and "us," the plural possessive
"our," as well as rhetoric that resonates with peaceful and stable liberal
democracies, his speech tends towards the universal and papers over the
complexities that exist in Northern Ireland society. That is, he seems to be
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promoting (perhaps prematurely) the notion of a united Northern Ireland civic
culture rather than explicitly acknowledging the cultural identities of the multiple
number of groups who have been and continue to be negatively affected by the
recent Troubles and the ensuing peace process.
On a similar point, Riggins writes that an "elite speaker's claim to believe
in inclusiveness may be undermined by contradictions between words and syntax; a
close reading of most political speeches should reveal that the identity of "we"
fluctuates depending on the particular rhetorical point the speaker or writer is trying
to make" (Riggins, 1997, p. 8). In a later speech given to introduce former President
Bill Clinton, Trimble remarked, "we must now get down to the historic and
honorable task of this generation: to raise up a new Northern Ireland in which
unionists and nationalists work in partnership. I believe we can provide a pluralist
Parliament for a pluralist people - a Government by this people - for this people"
(Trimble, 1998, p. 79). Here, Trimble echoes the founding documents of the United
States and pays tribute to the Americans in his midst. Since he was not speaking to a
solely local audience, his selection of a liberal democratic adjective ("pluralist")
over a plural possessive ("our") was of necessity. The alliteration of his last
sentence and conscious repetition of "people" and "pluralist" leaves the audience
with a very specific sounding message without the hassle of having to account for
who the people he is talking about are and what pluralism means in practice.
"All Sections Will Be Working Together"
In much the same universalistic and generalized vein, in his Nobel Prize
speech, former SDLP leader John Hume remarked that "all sections will be working
together" and that "both sections of our people" must learn to respect one another
(Grant, 2001, p. 138). In response to Hume's statement, "all of us are asked to
respect the views and rights of others as equal of our own," Grant (2001) cynically
remarks, "People do not respect others' views as 'equal of our own.' Catholic
nationalists don't respect the anti-Catholicism of the Orange Order; many
Protestants resent the Catholic Church and deplore the Catholic ethos of much
traditional nationalism" (Grant, 2001 , p. 139). Grant clearly is critical of what he
sees as Hume's overly optimistic attitude and hollow rhetoric. Although focusing on
what unites all people in Northern Ireland (namely, human rights), such language
can have the effect of minimizing or hiding the particularistic nature of communities
in Northern Ireland. Grant later comments that he wishes Hume had, through his
language "provide[d] some indication that he is conscious of the complexities and
trials of finding the peace and reconciliation he so willingly advocates" (Grant,
2001, p. 140). In using universalistic terms of the modem liberal democratic
tradition, both Hume and Trimble-intentionally or otherwise-effectively painted
over the complexity that comes with multiple cultural traditions. However, one may
say that there is a certain degree of ambiguity, optimism, and bravado necessary in
language when political leaders are attempting to build a bridge between divided
peoples; additionally, subtlety, complexity, and nuance might induce people to lose
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interest. Certainly, the use of simplifying rhetoric is not relegated to politicians in
Northern Ireland. Simple messages (the Bush Administration's "War on Terror"
motto, "You're either with us or you're against us," for example) are popular
political tools designed not so much to educate constituencies as to motivate and
mobilize, or at least, gamer passive compliance with legislation and policy that
advance a political agenda. An outlet designed to unpack complex messages and
tap into people's depth of feeling and experience can be found in poetry, music, and
drama.
"High" Cultural Content
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The use of rhetoric for political purposes at crafting the macro-level
discourse is not the only manifestation of language which can provide insight into
the culture of Northern Ireland, the Troubles and the peace process. Poetry, prose,
and plays may constitute "high" culture, but they are also significant components of
cultural narrative, able to give voice to the multiplicity of interpretations of the
conflict and peace process, and to exemplify how people make sense of their lived
experience. In Moral Imagination, Lederach (2005) reasons, "Art, be it Haiku
poetry, jazz, or visual art, offers a critically important alternative lens through which
one might more clearly visualize the scope and essence of a conflict" (Lederach,
2005, 175). Although Bennett (1998) criticizes writers, playwrights, and poets for
rendering work which is "apolitical, disengaged, and skeptical. ..marked by
aloofness, by being above it all, by self-conscious distance from the two proletarian
tribes fighting out their bloody, pointless, atavistic war," the work of people like
Seamus Heaney, Eavan Boland and others have attempted to make sense of the
Troubles and its impact on their lives (Bennett, 1998, p. 199-200).
For example, Heaney (1990) interweaves his frustration at the "famous
Northern reticence" and pervasive effects that the Northern Irish conflict has had on
the culture of communication that has arisen: "Where to be saved you only must
save face/And whatever you say, you say nothing" (Heaney, 1990, p. 92). In
addition, writers incorporate their heritage into their work not simply as a useful
device, but mindfully to retain their cultural character in the face of conflict.
Questing for freedom of expression and deep connection to cultural and experiential
roots, Boland writes in "The Muse Mother": "If I could only decline her-/lost noun
lout of context,/stray figure of speech-/from this rainy street/again to her roots,/she
might teach me/a new language" (Haberstroh, 1996, p. 70). Highlighting the deep
connections between nuance and culture, and between language and politics
expressed in Northern Irish poetry, Haberstroh (1996) writes, "attuned to the
nuances of language, the links between language and culture, and the political
implications of the disappearance of the native tongue, some modem poets try to
keep Irish alive while writing in English" (Haberstroh, 1996, p. 161). Artists have
also sought to capture and express frustration, outrage, and so ·on related to specific
historical events, such as Bloody Sunday.
The place of Bloody Sunday in history has not been relegated to textbooks
and legal proceedings. It has been the subject of song ("Sunday Bloody Sunday" by
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U2, 1983), poetry ("Butcher's Dozen: A Lesson for the Octave of Widgery" by
Thomas Kinsella), and film (Bloody Sunday by Paul Greengrass, 2002). Ironically,
the Bloody Sunday Inquiry itself recently has become the subject of stage
performance (Bloody Sunday: Scenes from the Saville Inquiry by Richard NortonTaylor, 2005) and has been subjected to mixed reviews. While the final report from
the Inquiry has not been created and disseminated, thoughts, feelings and
experiences appear to have been inducted into the cultural narrative, via artistic
expressions, that involves Bloody Sunday and subsequent inquiries into the events
of that tragic day.
Sunday Bloody Sunday
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On January 30, 1972, a civil rights march in L'Derry ended tragically with
the deaths of fourteen civilians. In April of that same year, upon concluding a swift
investigation, Lord Widgery exonerated the soldiers involved, claiming that they
had been fired upon first and that the tragedy could have been avoided "if there had
not been an illegal march, which had created 'a highly dangerous situation"' (BBC
News, March 24, 2000). As a result of the Widgery Report, no soldiers were found
guilty or held accountable for their actions. However, inconsistencies in the report,
flawed evidence, and failure to call eyewitnesses for their testimony left many
dissatisfied and outraged with the report.
Seeking justice and an accurate account of events, the families of those who
had been killed or injured on Bloody Sunday campaigned for a new inquiry.
Honoring their request, on January 29, 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced
to the House of Commons that a new inquiry would begin later that year. The
central task of the Inquiry was to find suitable answers to the questions of why and
how were civilians were killed or wounded on Bloody Sunday; it was not a trial
designed to find favor of one side or another (BBC News, November 2004). Led by
an international tribunal of judges, the first hearings of the Saville Inquiry
(significantly renamed as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry) began in April 1998; public
hearings ensued in March 2000 and concluded in November 2004.
Over its seven-year tenure, the tribunal received written statements from
nearly 2,500 individuals and, of that total number, 921 witnesses were called to give
oral testimony amassing millions of words and many thousands of pages of data.
The witnesses included politicians, the Prime Minister at the time, civilians, police,
soldiers and IRA members-the plethora of voices included in the proceedings is
encouraging that a meaningful, coherent, and resonant account of the day's events
will ultimately come to light. At the close of the Inquiry, it was predicted that the
judges would issue a final report the following summer, however, a press release
issued by the Inquiry announced: "The report is currently in preparation. It has been
necessary for the Tribunal to look at a very large quantity of material so that it is not
possible at this stage to give any firm estimate of when the report is likely to be
finished" (Barr 2005). As of spring 2006, no final report has been issued. Even so,
spending millions of pounds in one of the UK's most expensive legal proceedings
speaks volumes about its commitment to learning and to sharing the truth about
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what happened on January 20, 1972. Once produced, the Inquiry's findings may
become a transformative denouement for narratives of Bloody Sunday, showing that
a formerly repressive, discriminatory, and democratic government can redress
grievances and seek justice in both word and deed, albeit decades later.

Concluding Thoughts
Recognizing that language does not tell the whole story of the Northern
Irish experience of the Troubles or current peace process, I have attempted in this
paper to show how language, as a transmitter and constitutor of cultural narrative,
has played and continues to play a role in shaping the path peace and reconciliation
may take. Some related questions remain unanswered: Will the ambiguity of some
of the language used in the Agreement be a help or hindrance to the peace process
in the long run? How and with what effects might the Bloody Sunday Inquiry report
have upon competing cultural narratives? A more elaborate examination of public
texts, representative of different realms of society, may reveal answers to such
questions.
Infusing current cultural narratives with the language and lessons from the
realm of conflict resolution may indeed become part of the popular, political, and
civic culture. As mentioned previously, Secretary Reid advocated the need to adopt
a "new language" to move into the reconciliation phase. This recognition (whether
conscious or unconscious) underscores the primary role language has played and
continues to play in culture regeneration in the North, but misses the mark in terms
of conflict transformation: listening to many voices and crafting insightful analysis
of competing narratives are necessary to buttress the narrow bridges that do span the
divided communities. Lederach (1997, 2005) advocates such elicitive and
imaginative approaches. Since ethnic identity arises through interaction that
maintain social boundaries and through consequent competition over resources, the
way people speak to each other and the words they choose clearly plays a crucial
role in the identity-formation and culture-creation processes (Arthur 2002). The
Holy Cross conflict and continued conflicts within interface communities
throughout the region suggest that much more listening and responding to needs are
necessary, more so than a "new language" of reconciliation without structural
adjustments to support the talk. In addition, since many terms currently used in
rhetoric by politicians are densely packed with meaning, historical experiences, and
emotional connections, creating social spaces for a new cultural narrative to emerge
appears to be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of peace, especially if
structural adjustments are outpaced by promises. Recognizing the possibly
problematic ties to the past and personal experience in the face of moving on with
one's life, Boland writes in "Fever": " ... as if silence could become rage,/as if what
we lost is a contagion/that breaks out in what cannot be/shaken out from words or
beaten out/from meaning and survives to weaken/what is given, what is certain"
(Haberstroh, 1996, p. 78).
The emergence of a mid-level discourse, emanating from the work of, for
example, Democratic Dialogue (Northern Ireland's first think tank); university
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faculty from Queen's, University of Ulster, and elsewhere; grassroots peace
organizations which use community dialogue projects, workshops, and conferences,
all have created the social space for the exchange of ideas and sharing of stories.
The material for exploring cultural narratives and learning where, when, and how
they conflict is available and essential for the study of peace and conflict.
Accessing, analyzing, and engaging with public texts, is crucial to understanding
not only the cultural aspects of the Northern Irish conflict and peace process, it may
also be helpful in the study of other ethnopolitical conflicts and peace processes.
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Endnotes

s in Discourse.

1 1n this paper, when referring to the Good Friday Agreement, Belfast Agreement or the
Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, I will use "the Agreement" for shorthand.
2
Gleaning from Foucault's concept of discourse, I will use the term as Riggins (1997)
outlines it: " ... a systematic, internally consistent body of representations," which, being
comprised of intertexual meaning and interpretations, "[does] not faithfully reflect reality
like mirrors ... Instead, [discourses] are artifacts of language through which the very reality
they purport to reflect is constructed" (Riggins, 1997, p. 2).
3 A former professor of mine, Chris R. Mitchell, explained this distinction early on to his
2001 incoming class of PhD students at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
4 Huntington (1993) writes, "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in
this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions
will be cultural" (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). And later, " ... violent conflicts between groups
in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that
could lead to global wars ... " (Huntington, 1993, p. 48). Of the short term suggestions for
resisting the supposed inevitable draw towards conflict, Huntington suggests that "it is
clearly in the interest of the West. .. to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian
and Islamic states" (Huntington, 1993, p. 49).
5 Hall (1977) created the high and low context distinctions; Ting-Toomey (1999) describes,
"By low context communication we emphasize how intention or meaning is best expressed
through explicit verbal messages. By high context communication we emphasize how
intention or meaning can best be conveyed through the context. .. and the nonverbal
channels ... ofthe verbal message" (Ting-Toomey, 1999, p. 100).
6 To be fair, Weaver recognizes that "as with aB typologies, these descriptions never apply
to everyone in a particular culture at all times" (Weaver, 1998, p. 74).
7 Essentially, the idea that language shapes our experiences, perceptions, and actions, linking
the individual to "cultural reality" in a complex, reflexive relationship.
8 For an example of narrative analysis see Liisa Malkki's study of Hutu refugee cultures in
Purity and Exile.
9 The term and concepts of "othering" is gleaned from Stephen Harold Riggins' chapter,
"The Rhetoric ofOthering". See the bibliography for full citation.
10 For a complete discussion of the concept, "civic nationalism," see McGarry (2001).
11 This phrase, "rhetoric ofreconciliation," was coined by Patrick Grant (2001).
12 To Raise Up a New Northern Ireland is the title of a publication which includes articles
and speeches given by First Minister Trimble between the years 1998 and 2000. See the
bibliography for the full citation.
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SUPRANATIONAL NETWORKS: STATES AND FIRMS

Alvin W. Wolfe

Abstract

The nation-state systems that seem to dominate the global landscape are not
necessarily the pinnacle of evolution. A conglomeration of interacting factors
spelled doom for the traditional colonialism of previous centuries while providing
an ideal environment for multinational firms operating above the level of
nation-states to play an important role in the generation of a new
politico-socio-economic system better described by network models than by
ordinary political models. Previously existing units and subunits, in the course of
adjustment and adaptation to changing circumstances, change their relations with
one another and are, sometimes, newly integrated in a novel manner such that new
units or subunits are recognizable.
It is puzzling that most scholars still see these changes as merely quantitative
growth rather than as a qualitatively new system at a supranational level of
integration. Because human beings start from concepts we already know, one really
has to be strongly motivated to try to go beyond the cognitive concepts one uses
regularly to attempt to conceive of something different. In the perspective of
millions of years of evolution both states and business firms are relatively recent
emergents out of the processes of adaptation that generate all social formations .
Both business firms and nation states are kinds of corporations, and it is a mistake
to deal separately with the international network of states when it seems perfectly
obvious that the supranational system includes interacting states and corporations
in a single complex network. Most countries are not "natural" nation-states, but are
corporations whose control over some territory is recognized by some other states.
States and companies should be treated similarly in analysis of the supranational
system and the best model for studying the supranational system is a network model
that begins with defining units and their relationships. In that mode, applying
various mathematical algorithms, one can find clusters and equivalence sets
representing different levels of organization in the network. At the same time as
states are infl,uencingfirms, firms are busily influencing states.
Introduction

During the past 25 years I have from time to time expressed a persistent
theme, namely that the nation-state systems that seem to dominate the sociocultural
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landscape are not necessarily the pinnacle of evolution. Their preeminent position
is being eroded as new forms of organization are generated at a higher level. The
relative equilibrium of the international system was punctuated, one might say,
following World War II and especially during the 1960s when a conglomeration of
interacting factors spelled doom for the traditional colonialism of the previous
centuries while providing an ideal environment for industry and commerce on a
global scale. Multinational firms operating above the level of nation-states play an
important role in the generation of this new politico-socio-economic system. The
new system is better described by network models than by ordinary social system
models. The flow of information and the control of resources in the network must
be traced if the emerging system is to be described and understood.
I first encountered the new system a quarter century ago when I studied the
chaotic events through which Congo became Zaire (Wolfe 1962,1963). I saw how
states were weakened relative to companies that were able to operate above the
level at which states ordinarily have sovereignty, and I illustrated my reports on the
process with data from the nonferrous metals industries that operated in what are
now Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola but were largely controlled from
Belgium, Great Britain, the Republic of South Africa and the United States. Figure
1 reproduces one of those illustrations from 1962.
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Figure 1. Perspectives on the Supranational Integration of the mining industry in
southern Africa, 1962.

Those observations were for me clear illustrations of the more general
processes by which new social phenomena are generated: Previously existing units
and subunits, in the course of adjustment and adaptation to changing circumstances,
change their relations with one another and are, sometimes, newly integrated in a
novel manner such that new units or subunits are recognizable.
As the years have gone by there have been scores of studies of
multinational enterprise by scholars from many disciplines. I see now more and
more evidence of the evolutionary changes I had foreseen then. But I find it
puzzling that most scholars still see these changes as merely a matter of quantitative
growth, not, as I see them, as having initiated a qualitatively new system at a
supranational level of integration.
I have been trying to figure out what it is that prevents social scientists,
even anthropologists, from envisioning something genuinely new.
Difficulties of Thinking Anew

Unfortunately, we human beings have to start from concepts we already
know. That is the crux of the problem right there. One really has to be strongly
motivated to try to go beyond the cognitive concepts one uses regularly to attempt
to conceive of something different. We, even we anthropologists, are limited in
what we may think. Cultural relativism means just that. The principle of relativism
applies, even to those of us who strive to be universalistic, scientific, above it all:
"Judgments are based on experience and experience is interpreted by each in terms
of his own enculturation" (Herskovits 1955). We can easily adjust from seeing the
glass half empty to seeing the glass half full, but it strains us a bit to hear, from
George Carlin, that the glass is really twice as large as it needs to be.
If anybody can shake loose the shackles that bind us mentally and
mechanically from appropriately interpreting events of the modem world it should
be anthropologists. One of the obstacles to our understanding the wider systems of
the modem world, call them supranational systems or world systems or systems of
international scope, is that common concepts like state, nation-state, country, and
firm, company, and corporation are imbued with cultural meanings that have been
fixed not only in our languages and minds but also in our institutional memories as
well. We put states and business firms in completely separate boxes, making it
difficult to see that their interactions are generating a system at a level of integration
that I call supranational, above the level of any given nation.
While states and business firms have been around for some thousands of
years, in the perspective of millions of years of evolution these are both relatively
recent emergents from the processes of adaptation that generate all social
formations. Anthropologists have not given these forms the kind of attention we
have lavished on institutions of family and kinship and community. Now, when it is
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critical that we understand them and their relations, we seem to be accepting the
wisdom of conventional political scientists and economists. We have not subjected
these concepts -- business firm, corporation, state -- to analysis in the light of our
own comparative and emic/etic perspectives.
I was pleased some years ago to see James Dow's (1973) discussion of what
he labeled the "muddled concept of corporation." Unfortunately, not many picked
up on his call for "the reformulation of a concept of corporation that will be more
precise and useful to social anthropology" (1973:906). We are no better off now.
Perhaps worse, because now I see no discussion whatsoever of the issues in which I
am interested. But while I applaud Dow's intentions that we should be clear about
whatever we talk about, I believe the need right now is for a general concept
referring to a generalized social formation or cultural construction general enough
to include the variations which are in fact presenting the evolutionary options we
are trying to understand. We need a general concept that will encompass all forms
of social formations that control persons, resources, and benefits, to use Nadel's
(1951) terms.
M.G. Smith (1974) intended the concept of corporation to provide a
framework for the study of all human organization. I agree that we have such a
need. Smith, however, might not agree with me that the ordinary business firm or
company is as good an example of the general type as is the nation-state. I say that
not because Smith explicitly excluded business firms from the category of social
units he called corporations, but only because in his 383-page book entitled
Corporations and Society I can find no mention of a business firm or company.
The "notion of corporations that informs (his) essays" was certainly broad enough:
"All social units assumed to be perpetual and identified by distinct autonomies
within given spheres which have the organization necessary to manage these affairs,
(and) are units with a public character and capacity" (1974:85).
A more recent case demonstrating the need to clarify our thinking about
states and corporations in international trade is the work of David A. Smith and
Douglas White presented at the Sixth Annual International Sunbelt Social Network
Conference in Santa Barbara, "Change in the World Economy? A Network Analysis
of International Trade: 1965-1980" (1986). They described the structure that
results from analysis of the reported flow of commodities among eighty countries.
Using their regular equivalence algorithm, they were pleased to find a structure that
they felt generally conformed with the expectations of the world-system
perspective, that is they found some countries they could label core, some they
could label periphery, then some in a category called semiperiphery, which could be
divided into "advanced semiperiphery" and "secondary semiperiphery" even as the
core can be divided into the core, per se, and a secondary core. Finally, in
comparing such analyses at different points in time and finding that some nations
seem to rise or fall from one of these sub-categories into another, Smith and White
believe they have information that could be useful for developing a more precise
and dynamic theory of the operation of the world economy. (See also Smith and
White 1988 and 1992.)
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I have no argument with the method of analysis used by Smith and White.
Their regular equivalence algorithm certainly appears to be the best method of
identifying equivalent positions in a complex network. I am sorry to see them use
such a sensitive device on data that are so grossly inadequate, and am sorry to see
them associate it with a theoretical model (world system) that strikes me as being
little more than a culturally constructed history having no explanatory power or
prospects.
I harbor grave doubt about the prospects of successfully understanding the
modern world economy by categorizing nation states into two, three, four, seven or
any number of positions along a dimension of core-periphery. This is what the
World System people have been talking about for fifteen years, but that is not the
way the system works. Countries or nation states are not the only actors in the
world economy, they are not the only nodes in the network of actors that must be
taken into account. Effective actions and transactions made by multinational firms
are not all subsumed within the trade statistics of one or another nation-state.
I have not seen explicit arguments that states and business firms are
fundamentally different kinds of social formations, but I have noticed that most
anthropological studies that deal with them at all treat them separately and
independently. I just mentioned that M.G. Smith (1974) devoted eight essays to the
subject of corporations as fundamental entities in human societies, including
modern societies, and never mentioned business firms. Could it be that they were
meant to be excluded? Similarly perplexing to me is the fact that Lloyd Fallers
(1974) published an entire book of essays, The Social Anthropology of the
Nation-State, and never mentioned the concept of corporation. Nor did he, by the
way, mention business firms as having any bearing on the social anthropology of
the nation-state.
For me, and in conformity with Smith's and most other definitions (Maine
1884, Weber 1947, and see Dow 1973 for others), both business firms and nation
states are kinds of corporations, both companies and countries are kinds of
corporations.
Errors of Inaccuracy and Errors of Omission

There are several kinds of errors here. First, there is the kind of error that
Bernard, Killworth et al. (1984) hammered away at for so many years, informant
inaccuracy. The governments of these states that Smith and White are studying are
just about as inaccurate in their reporting of commodity trade connections as
Bernard and Killworth found network informants to be. Second, there is the error
that results from failure to count all the actors in the system without having any
formula by which to adjust for missing data.
Since the latter part of the twentieth century, one cannot talk about the
world economy without deliberately taking into account the actions and transactions
of multinational firms and enterprises. Many multinational corporations are
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engaged in transactions of greater dollar value than the entire trade of many of the
nation-states studied.
The argument has been made that every firm is included in one or another
nation-state. While there is a certain legal truth in that view, there are also good
reasons to view the situation differently. We are talking here about control over
resources and control over persons. Of course, every corporation is registered in
one or more states, and many transactions of multinational corporations are included
in the statistics for countries or states, but if you really want to know about the
world economy, you must also attempt to trace the decisions major corporations
make about the disposition of the goods and services under their control.
Multinational corporations make a variety of arrangements to assure that
transactions do not appear as transactions in order to avoid duties, taxes, imposts,
publicity, etc.
At the 1986 Sun Belt Social Network Conference, Linton Freeman, Kim
Romney, and Sue Freeman (1986, but see also Freeman 1992) presented an
interesting paper on the problem of informant accuracy. That paper has a parallel in
our situation at the supranational level. "Somewhere between experience and
recall," they said, "our informants were somehow warping the information about the
event(s)." Freeman, Romney and Freeman explained that persons develop mental
structures that reflect the regularities of their experience. Those structures then
intrude on perception and recall in such a way that experiences are shaped by
expectations as they are stored in memory. True as this may be for individual
informants, such mechanisms operate in an exaggerated fashion as we move up
from individuals through institutional levels. And when we reach that cultural
construction that goes by the name of nation state those institutional memory
distortions get fixed almost indelibly. I agree with anthropologist Cyril Belshaw's
(1976) complaint that the concept of national boundary distorts our analyses of
social reality. Social science interpretations are falsely biased by nationalistic
assumptions and the national bases of data collection. We seem to have built
national states so firmly into our culture that even a school of social history that
purports to be interested in World Systems ends up merely cataloging and ranking
nation-states on a core-periphery scale.
All of our institutions are biased in that way so that it is difficult to find data
that are independent of the nationalist assumption. Mary Douglas makes a pithy
observation in her 1986 book, How Institutions Think: "Institutions have the
pathetic megalomania of the computer whose whole vision of the world is its own
program" (1986:92). How appropriate an image for this network problem!
The Difference between International and Supranational

The differentiation of roles in the world economy (call it division of labor if
you wish) is not just among different kinds of states. States do certain things, firms
and other entities do other things, and there are interrelationships among the two
kinds of units.

Peac:e and Conflict StudieJ; • Volume 13, Number 1
- 73 -

Supernational Networks: States and Firms

In the early 1960s my concern with the problems of new African states led
me to study carefully the nonferrous ores and metals industry that so dominated the
southern half of the continent. In a paper presented to the American
Anthropological Association in 1962 I reported that the mining and metals
industries there were systematically organized at what I called a "supranational"
level of integration.
In 1963, I wrote:
I found the mineral extraction industry of southern Africa to be
organized in an intricate ... system based more on overlapping
membership of a variety of groups than on bureaucratic
centralization of administrative power. The network binds groups
that are different both structurally and functionally, some business
corporations, some states, some families, in a modem supranational
structure that is more than just international. ... The several hundred
mining companies operating in southern Africa are integrated
through a series of relationships that focus on some of the larger
among them. . . . Then, in a variety of ways these corporations are
linked to governments" (Wolfe 1963:153-154).
I argued then, and still defend today, the proposition that the interaction of
corporations and states (and cities and families as well) is generating a genuinely
new system at a level of integration above that level where states and corporations
ordinarily operate. I called that a system at a supranational level of integration.
The Network or System at a Supranational Level
I think it is a mistake to consider only the relations of states and ignore
non-state corporations operating in the world economy. Furthermore, I think it is a
mistake to consider only one kind of relation,that based on the trade of
commodities. As I studied the real network operating at the supranational level in
southern Africa in the 1960s I saw a plexus of ties relating companies, governments,
persons, institutions of many kinds. Describing the systematic nature of the
network at that time I said:
No one unit can really break out in a new direction,
introduce any drastic change without other units being
aware of it and adjusting their own strategies. If a new
development appears threatening, influences will be felt
from many quarters.
International financiers always
rationalize their actions of granting or withholding credit
by reference to market information, but they are guided by
all system information within the network, not just market
information.
Individual businessmen who manage
multinational corporations are considerably influenced by
knowledge of all these interconnections. In consequence,
the multinational behavior of most companies and
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Among these connections are the interlocking directorates that have been fairly well
studied. But there is much more. Joint ventures are legion, especially in the mining
industry, in the supranational arena. Looked at from the perspective of one
company, joint ventures are risk-reduction strategies, but looked at from the
perspective of the supranational system, they are linkage mechanisms that promote
the integration of the system. Raymond Vernon (1974) says that joint ventures aid
corporations to "move toward a common set of cost structures," and to permit them
to "observe one another's competitive behavior at close range," and help to satisfy
the objectives both of sharing strengths and of encouraging cooperation. States, by
the way, are often partners in these joint ventures. How can one talk meaningfully
of international networks without taking into account such important linkages?
Why do otherwise fine scholars continue to deal separately with the
international network of states when it seems perfectly obvious that the
supranational system includes interacting states and corporations in a single
complex network? I feel much like Russ Bernard and Peter Killworth must have
felt all those years when they kept telling us informant data are inaccurate and we
kept using it anyway. I believe the problems are analogous. We use informant data
anyway simply because it is available. I believe Smith and White, and all the
hundreds of econometricians who play in the international trade arena, use country
data simply because it is readily available, whereas truer, more realistic data are
difficult to collect.
This may be the appropriate place to say something also about Fennema's
(1982) study of the international networks of banks and industry, one of the few
who does take seriously the relations among firms without regard to state
affiliations. His study has a serious flaw of a different but related kind. By limiting
the study to firms of large size Fennema must have missed many important linkages
that are deliberately constructed by such mechanisms as joint ventures. Certainly
among the corporations whose African interests I studied, bridges between giants
existed in the form of smaller corporations controlled jointly by the larger ones.
It should be clear that those studies of interlocking directorates, etc.,
internationally, suffer also from failure to take adequately into account the direct
involvement of governments in linking corporations. In my studies of the system in
southern Africa I found many forms of interaction between governments and the
so-called private sector. Abstract network studies based on one type of tie arc
doomed to error.
The Similarities between States and Business Firms
Purists of one stripe or another might criticize my contention that we should
include states and corporations together in the same network (international or
supranational). Critics might argue that they are fundamentally different kinds of

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 1
- 75 -

Supemational Networks: States and Firms

social formations. Most studies have looked separately and independently at the
networks of states and business firms. I note with some approval M. Fennema's
statement regarding the relations between the political and the economic, "If the
analysis of the economic structure is deficient, the whole theory (of imperialism)
falls apart" (1982:75).
In any event, firms and states share much more than differentiates them. A
state is a kind of corporation, the kind that is ordinarily associated with a given
territory and whose right to use force on that territory is recognized by some others
in a general way.
Corporations that are not states differ from those that are in that their
control of resources and benefits and people may not be so widely recognized.
Their right to use force may not be so widely recognized, nor are they associated so
strongly with a territory that defines their area of operations. It does not take much
thought to appreciate that these differences are far from absolute. They are matters
of degree or matters that can change in a short time.
Give a company that controls some resources the right to use force on a
territory and suddenly it is a state. That is precisely what happened a hundred years
ago when the International Company of the Congo, which had financed exploration
and set up trading relations with peoples up and down the Congo River as a private
company in 1884 was recognized by American President Chester A. Arthur as a
"friendly power." Becoming a state did not require any change in form, only some
change in its external relations. It did improve the standing of the company with
other states, however, and that was generally good for business.
When we talk of countries and nations we tend to think they are something
special and natural in the sense that they are generated by some immanent
sociocultural forces. Most countries are not "natural" nation-states. They are
corporations whose control over some territory is recognized by some other states.
There is, furthermore, enormous variation among states, not only in size but also in
mode of integration and control and in many other respects.
Most of the larger corporations in the world, say the 200 that make up the
network of banks and industry that M. Fennema reported on in 1982, could be states
if their right to use force over a territory were recognized by one or more current
states. You might agree with me that a state's right to use force is not that much
more effective than other means of exerting control over situations. All the more
reason to play down the differences between companies and countries. Some years
ago, Charles Caro (1977 unpublished personal communication) ranked corporations
and states by the size of their economic product and found that 44 of the top 100
were non-state corporations. That proportion would be higher today.
Perhaps a note is in order here to explain why it is that I am so concerned
that states and companies should be treated similarly. It is because the best model
for studying the kind of system that they are involved in is a network model. That
model begins with defining units and their relationships. Then, applying various
mathematical algorithms, one can find clusters in the network, one can ascertain
indices of centrality for various units or for various clusters in the network, one can
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identify sets of units occupying equivalent pos1t10ns and, even, I hypothesize,
equivalence sets representing different levels of organization in the network.
When one treats companies as a distinct class of entities, and treats
countries as a distinct class of entities, one ends up, at best, with two distinct
networks, the one relating companies to one another, the other relating countries to
one another, with no logically simple way ofrelating the two networks. If I learned
anything in my studies of the multinationally organized nonferrous metals industry
in the 1960s it was that there are relationships between companies and states. It
remains to define those relations so that they can be appropriately represented in a
graph or matrix. To do this successfully, it is not necessary that all the units be
identical, only that they all be represented.
Once it is recognized that countries and companies, states and business
firms, have relations, the question arises as to the nature of those relations. I will
not try here to identify all possible modes of those relations, nor is that necessary to
benefit from the use of a network model. Among the types or modes are:
* state ownership of firm
* host country participation in ownership
* company influence on government of home country
* company influence on government of host country
* constraints applied by state where parent firm is incorporated
* constraints applied by host country
At the same time as the states are influencing the firms, the firms are busily
influencing the states. The proper network model must include both companies and
states. Analytic separation of these actors is formal folly.
As an example of how such general relations might be specified somewhat
more, I quote nine conditions reported in a Research Report by The Conference
Board, which advertises itself as "a global network of leaders who exchange
information on management, economic and public policy issues" (Berenbeim 1983):
1. Local governments are attempting to limit repatriation of assets
orearnmgs.
2. Local interests are demanding financial participation in the
company enterprise, either directly or through local
governments.
3. Local governments are imposing restrictions on the company's
ability to charge local units research fees for work done in
its central laboratories.
4. Local interests or governments are requiring that component
parts or raw materials be purchased from local suppliers.
5. Local interests or governments are demanding the company
establish a research facility or transfer important
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6.

7.
8.
9.

technology within or to the country in which the company
is doing business.
Local interests or governments are demanding that local
nationals be appointed to top-management positions in
local company operations.
Local governments are limiting the company's share of local
markets.
Local governments are insisting that the company produce or sell
certain products as a condition of entry into local markets.
Local governments are imposing limits on levels of production.

That sample of ways governments attempt to influence company decisions
could easily be matched by a listing of the ways companies attempt to influence
governments and other institutions in the host countries and in the home countries
as well.
Clearly, understanding of this network of relations among companies and
states requires collection of data on the strength of these relations in particular
cases.
Organizations like The Conference Board are doing analyses from the
perspectives that are important for their purposes, yielding generalizations about
regional variations such as that Latin American countries figure prominently among
those that demand financial participation for local interests, restrict research
charges, limit repatriation of assets, and require local purchase of components or
raw materials" (Berenbeim 1983: 38). Meanwhile, anthropologists and other social
scientists are doing very little to clear their own agenda in order to tackle the
enormous task ahead.
Conclusion
In addition to getting better control over concepts identifying the kinds of
units we are dealing with and getting better control of the kinds of relations among
those units, we must also seek clarification of theoretical concepts which help to
distinguish levels of integration in complex systems. I have talked about relatively
simply bounded entities like corporations, companies and states. We must also
develop appropriate conceptual tools to handle phenomena like partnerships, limited
partnerships, joint ventures and other enterprises that involve cooperation of units
with some common goals. Economists and international trade scholars speak of a
theory of agency that deals with relations between principals and their agents. These
are some of the problems that need the light of the cross-cultural, holistic, emic
perspectives of anthropology before their full implications will be understood.
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Endnotes
This article is an expanded version of papers presented at the International Network for
Social Network Analysis Sun Belt Social Network Conference, Clearwater Beach, Florida,
February, 1987, and at the 86th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological
Association, in Chicago, November 20, 1987. Other works by the author on this subject are
available on the web via: http://luna.cas.usf.edu/- wolfo/Supranational-A WW.html
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RUDOLPH THE HAITIAN REINDEER AND OTHER HEROES:
HELPING CHILDREN PERFORM CHANGE

Anne Hearon Rambo, Nathalie Duque Bello, Maud Pasquel

Abstract

A meta analysis of studies concerning youth violence suggests that when children
see themselves and are seen by surrounding adults as positive, prosocial leaders,
they are less likely to become involved in bullying either as bullies or as victims (1).
MFT's have recently been encouraged to work more directly with children (2) and
to adapt their service delivery methods to the needs of clients (3). The authors
worked directly with 122 children in their community settings, involving parents
and school officials as an encouraging audience (4) to the children's new views of
themselves. 90% ofpreteen girls (ages 9 to 11), and 100% of young teens of both
genders (ages 12 to 14) saw themselves as more positive leaders after our 8 week
program; 89% of their parents and 90% of school officials independently saw
positive changes.
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Recent articles have suggested that in today's increasingly complex,
fragmented society, marriage and family therapists (MFT's) may need to push
beyond their previous comfort levels to meet the expanding needs of clients (5, 6).
MFT's have been encouraged to reach out to children (7) and to meet our clients
where they live (8). Along these lines, over the past year we have worked with
children in their after school settings. These children, ranging in age from 9 to 14,
came to our groups because they wanted to create change in their relationships with
peers - specifically, because they were concerned about bullying, teasing, and social
exclusion.
As systemic therapists, we wanted to work with these children, but not alone.
We wanted to involve the whole system. However, the parents of these children
were concerned about other issues, and for them their children's social interactions
were initially a low priority. School and center officials were willing to allow us to
work with these children in their settings, but had little to no spare time. The
solution to our dilemma was to involve the parents and school officials as a formal
audience for change, to reflect back the children's increasingly positive vision of
themselves (9). The process confirmed for us that MFT's have much to learn from
their child clients (10) and that community based programs can be useful both for
them and for us.
Inception of the Superb Project

EROES:

et

·h en children
1cial leaders,
victims (1).
(dren (2) and
The authors
lving parents
new views ~f
ieens of both
r our 8 week
?ndently saw

The original plan
Initially, our department of family therapy was approached by donors
(Jeremy and Sharon Ring), who wanted us to design an innovative anti-bullying
program. First, we reviewed the literature. Teasing, social exclusion, bullying, and
the school violence that too often result from them represent an increasing social
problem (11). The most effective programs to ameliorate the problems of bullying,
teasing, and social exclusion in the schools are based on the pioneering work of the
Norwegian researcher Dan Olweus (12, 13), or include similar large scale
involvement of relevant adults. Like the very effective Multidimensional Family
Intervention program (14), they are intensive programs including all relevant
systems: family, school, and community (15). We embraced the idea of such an
approach, and even named our project SUPERB (Students United with Parents and
Educators to Resolve Bullying). We envisioned a project like the Olweus program:
interventions infused throughout the school day and repeated by parents at home.
Such optimal programs are eloquently described by the Youth Violence Prevention
Resource Center as involving and training all children, all parents, and "everyone
associated with the school, including janitors, cafeteria workers, and crossing
guards" (www.safeyouth.org,).
Reality Check
Then we took a second look at the realities of our situation. Broward
County, where we live and work, is the sixth largest school district in the United
States, and the largest to be fully accredited (www.browardschools.com). The
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countywide district already has several anti-bullying programs in place, focused on
violence prevention and peer mediation. With so much else to contend with, there
was no possibility that school staff would have time for any additional training or
work with us. In addition, with annual standardized testing required for each child,
academics are paramount, and no portion of the public school day could be used for
a program like we had in mind. Meanwhile, the parents were even less interested.
Many of the parents in our prospective sample were recent immigrants who were
overwhelmingly and understandably concerned with their children's survival and
achievement in school, as well as the exigencies of daily family life in a difficult
situation. Children's social interactions were a lower priority for them.
Well, we had fulfilled our original donor's request to review the literature
and develop a comprehensive plan. We could have stopped there, and some of our
initial team understandably chose to do so. But two factors led others of us to
explore a different option.
Encouragement and Maps
The first factor was the unexpected and timely encouragement of the
Broward Sheriffs Office. During our pilot exploration of our original plan, our
MFT master's interns were in several schools talking with students. One middle
school student told our interns she was contemplating suicide due to the bullying
she was experiencing. With appropriate faculty supervision, they handled the
incident well. Learning of this, the Broward Sheriffs Office offered to pick up the
funding for our program if we found some way to be in public schools or Boys and
Girls Clubs which served an at risk population.
The second factor was our fascination with the maps. When talking with
students at a local high school, we suggested that they draw us a map of their
school's social groups. Seeing their enthusiastic response to this, we began doing
this at every school we visited. Soon we had a large collection of intricate maps,
showing us exactly where particular groups stood around in each school, and
painstaking lettered with explanations like "Here's where the Haitians stand in the
courtyard- they talk to the Jamaicans, but the Jamaicans don't talk to them", "Only
the popular girls sit at the tables up front", and "These guys by the lockers are
wannabees - the real gangstas out behind the gym". Every map was different, but
every one included a request to come talk more about these issues. Clearly, in the
children's minds, some kind of intervention was desired.
The Revised Superb Project - What Happened Next

Family therapy foundations
The first author felt that we had a potential "customer" in these children
themselves (16). We developed an 8 week program which incorporated the basic
MRI principles of validating the client's reality and interrupting stuck solution
behavior (17). In the process, the program exemplified as well the first of the three
common factors identified as unique to MFT: a relational viewpoint, rather than one
which ascribes individual pathology (18).
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We validated the client's reality by working with the children's own goals
as much as possible, more than adults are usually willing to do with children. For
example, when the middle schoolers at School A poured out their anguish over all
the material things their more affluent peers flaunted, we did not lecture them about
how material things are not important in our culture, when clearly they are. Instead,
we brainstormed ways to help them get "things" other teens wouldn't have, like
bumper stickers not widely available which they could put on their schoolbooks.
When 5th grade girls commented to us that adults like pretty girls better, we
sympathized more than we sermonized. At times this was difficult (see our section
on training outcomes) but it was central to our program.
We attempted to interrupt stuck solution behavior by making the children
aware of options. We created a mnemonic device, DEFEND, which briefly
reviewed all possible legal options to being provoked (from D, distract, by saying
"Look, there's a bird!" or something), all the way to the final D, disappear and go
get a law enforcement official before you try go back to the scene. Intermediate
steps included making a joke (F for funny) and saying how you feel (E for
express)). Our curriculum otherwise consisted of art, music, and other expressive
activities, designed to help the children prepare for performing and celebrating their
accomplishments. Even here, we went with the client - we did more rap songs with
the middle schoolers and more art with the elementary school girls. Our curriculum
(19) is available online at www.nochildfearschool.org, but we wish to stress that we
feel the specific activities were not nearly as important as the overall atmosphere of
validation. We followed the excellent advice "When in doubt, praise" (20).
Finally, the idea that the children would perform for parents and school
officials was central to our program as well. It was important for us to build an
expanded therapeutic alliance, also identified as an important common factor in the
work of MFT's (21). We wanted to help our child clients celebrate themselves in
parent's and school official's eyes as well as their own (22). We would still be
SUPERB - but parents and educators would unite with students as an audience for
those students' changes. Children chose their preferred type of performance, as
described below under each school.
Program Specifics
We worked with 176 children (ages 8 to 14), in four settings: Middle
School A (an urban middle school serving a primarily low income population),
Middle School B (a suburban middle school serving a middle to upper middle
income population), a Boys and Girls Club Center, and a private parochial school.
All children were volunteers, responding to flyers and invitations asking "Would
you like to change the way people treat you, and/or the way you treat people?" In
person, we clarified that by "people", we primarily meant "people your own age".
(This was probably unnecessary; one middle school boy assured us "No one would
think people meant adults.")
We did not obtain research data from the third graders with whom we
worked, reasoning that they may not have been clear on the purpose of the group,
beyond its being fun. So that reduced our potential research population to 146,

~
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ranging in age from 9 to 14. Of this 146, 122 children completed the time
consuming process of obtaining consent forms from parents; making sure their
parents were available for both goal setting discussions before the interviews, and
follow up interviews after the eight week program; and participating in pre and post
interviews themselves. Thus, our research sample of 122 represents our most
motivated child clients.
Evaluation Methodology and Data Analysis
Initially, teens and parents responded to a checklist which had set categories
of goals, although they had the option to check "other" and write in something else
instead or in addition, as many of the parents did. Follow up was open ended. They
were asked at the conclusion of the program if they had noticed any changes,
positive or negative, and then asked to describe any changes they had noticed.
Their written descriptions were categorized using inductive content analysis to
identify common themes (23, 24). Teens were also asked to respond to hypothetical
scenarios, assessing their willingness to intervene to help a peer in need, both before
and after the 8 week program.
For the younger children, our preteen sample, the procedure was the same
with two minor changes. The preteens were not asked their response in hypothetical
situations. And instead of being given a checklist, they were simply asked at the
beginning of the group what they would want to have happen, and at the end of the
group if anything was different and if so, what. They were allowed to draw pictures
to accompany their response, and could choose not to respond, instead drawing an
unrelated picture. The procedure for preteen parents was the same as for the parents
of the teens.
In order for preteens or teens to be counted in our research sample, their
parents also had to complete the pre and post assessments. In cases where the
parents were not literate or were more comfortable speaking in Haitian Creole
(Kreyol), they were interviewed over the telephone or in person, and their responses
recorded verbatim. (Simply translating the forms into Kreyol was not an option, as
most
Kreyol
speakers
do
not
also
write
in
that
language
(www.culturalorientation.net/haiti/larnr.html ). Telephone interviews were also used
as follow up when parents failed to return surveys, so that all parents were included.
In every setting, school or center officials were interviewed in a focus group format
to ascertain their initial goals, and later any positive or negative changes they noted
as a result of the program.
Diversity Issues
Readers will note that we had a culturally diverse group of child clients,
typical of South Florida. Fortunately, our graduate program has a diverse student
body as well, and we were able to provide both Spanish and Kreyol speaking interns
as needed. We did not "match" interns to schools, but instead made sure each
school was served by a diverse, multilingual group of interns, so that we could
model collaboration. Unfortunately, however, we were not able to provide gender
diversity, as all of our interns were female, and this may have affected our results,
especially with the preteens.
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About the Preteen Groups
Numbers and demographics.
We worked with 4th and 5th graders at a Boys and Girls Club Center, and at
a private parochial school. 60 students at the parochial school and 25 children at the
Center completed the 8 week group and all necessary paperwork. Of these, 40 were
classified by their respective institutions as White Non-Hispanic (all from the
parochial school), 20 as Hispanic (18 from the parochial school and 2 from the
Center), 2 as Multiracial (from the parochial school), and 23 as Black Non-Hispanic
(all from the Center). We also noted a further division important to the children
with whom we worked: of the 23 Black Non-Hispanic children at the Center, 17 self
identified as Caribbean of African descent (Haitian, Bahamian, or Jamaican) and 6
identified as African-American. Most of the children who were of Caribbean
descent were the children of recent immigrants. The Center serves a low income
population. The parochial school receives some subsidies and serves a low to
middle income population.
Initial goals
The preteen children either had no particular goals for the group, other than
having fun (20 of the 30 boys at the parochial school, and 5 of the 30 girls at that
location) or had the goal of fighting less with friends (all 25 participants at the
Center, and 25 of the girls at the parochial school). So fighting was a big issue for
preteen girls. Initially, parents at the parochial school primarily were going along
with the program because the school thought it was a good idea (48 of 60). 12
parents also wanted to see their children bullied less by other girls. At the Center,
most parents would either have preferred that the group focus on academics ( 13 out
of 25, 52 %) or had no particular thoughts about the group (8 out of 25, 35%),
making 87% of the parents initially skeptical. Parochial school officials wanted to
see children become more helpful and cooperative. Center staff wanted children to
become less angry and tense, although the Center director was initially doubtful that
there was a need.
Clinical Observations.
To attend our group, children at the Center had to give up free play once a
week, and children at the parochial school had to give up physical education every
other week. When the initial novelty of our group wore off, this was a sacrifice
most of the boys did not want to make. They enjoyed our activities, but found the
subject matter of relationships boring over time. At the Center, more boys dropped
out of the group before completion, leaving us with 20 girls and only 5 boys. At the
parochial school, where the school did not allow the boys to drop out once they had
started, the boys grew restless. The girls, in contrast, were eager to see us and
wished aloud we would come more often. In both settings, the girls had many
complex incidents of bullying and being bullied by other girls to relate. One 4th
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grade boy asked in bewilderment, "Don't you girls ever just hit each other and be
done with it?"
Performances.
At the end of the 8 week program, the children performed to show off their
social leadership skills. At the Center, the children chose to put on a program of
skits, which was attended by 15 parents and/or grandparents. The children at the
parochial school chose to compile their essays and drawings into a paper bound
'journal", which they took home to their parents.
Program Results for Preteens
Evaluation Results - Children
At the parochial school, only 33% (4 out of 18 4th grade boys, and 6 out of
th
12 5 grade boys) of the boys noticed positive changes as a result of the program,
while 90% (9 of 12 4th grade girls, and all 18 5th grade girls) of the girls reported
positive changes. At the Center, all 25 participants (20 girls and 5 boys) reported
positive changes, but as already noted most of the boys had already voted with their
feet by leaving before this point. Numerous references suggest the social life of
girls is more complex at an earlier age (Simmons, 2002; Wiseman, 2002); we think
this was why the girls were so much more interested in the group at this preteen age.
Having an all female staff may have contributed also, although at the teen level, this
did not appear to make a difference. Ethnicity, interestingly, did not seem to make a
significant difference in response. But gender certainly did, and age as it related to
gender, with the older (5 th grade) boys more interested and positive.
Evaluation results - Adults
At the Center, 90% of the parents (20 out of 25) noted positive changes in
their children. This was in spite of their low level of interest in the program
initially. The Center director was pleasantly surprised also and noted less name
calling and a more cordial atmosphere. Two of the three staff also saw marked
positive changes, commenting the children seemed less angry and tense, but one
continued to see the children at the Center as "hard to control".
At the parochial school, the 4 th grade teacher saw positive changes in the
girls, whom she saw as taking more active and positive leadership roles. The 5th
grade teacher saw overall positive changes in his class, We did not interview the
parents at the parochial school, as at the request of the school they were separately
contacted by independent researchers from Florida Atlantic University, then
conducting program evaluations of several programs at the school (25). Their
findings were that the 4th grade parents rated the program as a 1 on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 0 being not at all effective and 5 being extremely effective. This fits for us
with the 4 th grade boys' restlessness, and the larger number of boys in that grade.
The 5th grade parents, however, told the F AU researchers they saw us as a 5 on the
same 1 to 5 scale. 11 parents also contacted us anyway to let us know their child
was being bullied less, and to thank the program. These were all parents of girls.
Themes
The most common theme for the preteen girls who noted positive outcomes
was Increased Leadership. Examples of responses coded in this category include:
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"I am a STAR. I can sing and dance really good now and my mama is going to get
me into a magnet school and I am a LEADER. " (Center, girl, age 10)
"So, this girl, who let's face it is not really one of us, tries to sit at our table. And
the other girls don't want to let her. But I said there is plenty of room and put my
arm around her. And guess what, she turns out to be funny and nice and we are
friends now. People listen to me because I am a leader and I might as well use that
power for good. " (Parochial school, girl, age 11). 90% of the parents at the Center
reported similar positive themes. Examples include:
"I learned so much about
my child I did not know. That girl is going places. " "Thank you, I see my child is a
leader after all "Center officials noted less name calling, decreased verbal fighting,
and an overall less angry atmosphere; the 4 th grade teacher at the parochial school
noted more girls in positive leadership positions, and the 5th grade teacher noted
more helpfulness, and more cooperation overall. Teachers in all three grades (3d5th) at the parochial schools, according to the FAU researchers (26) considered that
children were less tolerant of bullying and more likely to intervene to help others.
We were asked to return the following year at both Center and parochial school
locations.
About the Teen Groups
Numbers and demographics
We worked at 2 public middle schools, targeting the seventh grade at both.
At School A, a large urban middle school, an average of 30 seventh graders
attended our weekly after school group. Of these, 19 completed all the necessary
paperwork. The school demographics as compiled by the district are 2% Asian or
Pacific Islander, 54% Black Non-Hispanic, 31 % White Non-Hispanic, 2%
Multiracial, and 12% Hispanic. Of the 19 children in our research sample, 10 self
identified as Caribbean of African descent (primarily Haitian, Bahamian, and
Jamaican), 7 identified as African-American, and 2 identified as Hispanic. Many
were children of recent immigrants. At School B, a suburban magnet school, an
average of 25 seventh graders attended our weekly after school group, with 18
completing all the necessary paperwork. Of these 18, 6 identified as White NonHispanic, 3 as Hispanic, and 9 as Black non-Hispanic. The school demographics as
compiled by the district are 6% Asian or Pacific Islander, 36% Black Non-Hispanic,
36% White Non-Hispanic, 3% Multiracial, and 19% Hispanic.
Initial Goals
Initially, many of the teens who sought out our group were troubled by
what was happening in their peer relationships. Of the 19 at School A, 11 wanted to
get into less trouble and fewer fights at school, 4 wanted to bully less, and 17
wanted to get bullied less or make different friends. Of the 18 at School B, 6
wanted to get into less trouble and fewer fights, 4 wanted to bully less, and 11
wanted to get bullied less or make different friends. Thus, at both schools, 75% (28
out of 37) were unhappy with how peers treated them and wanted to fix that or get
different friends, and 46% (17 out of 37) got into trouble at school for fighting.
Their parents were also concerned about behavior problems at school. 15 of 19
parents at School A mentioned improved behavior as a goal, as did 12 of 18 at
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School B, for a total of 73% (27 of 37). But most parents were skeptical about the
group, with 13 out of 37 (35%) having no goals or preferring a different type of
group, and with those 73% of parents concerned about behavior focused primarily
on problems with adult authority figures. Peer group interaction did not seem like
as serious a concern: as one parent put it, "I just want my child to have a future."
School officials saw a need to decrease anger and help children manage anger
better.
Clinical observations
At this teenage level, we were equally successful with both genders, and
cultural/ethnic background also did not seem to make a difference in the findings.
However, it should be noted that children of color were more likely to seek out our
groups. Children, parents, and school officials were highly positive as the group
went on, despite the initial lack of enthusiasm on the part of parents. We were
surprised by the intense enthusiasm for the group on the part of the teens. They
wrote us long letters about this, which space permits us only to excerpt. Boys
appeared to be even more involved in the group than girls, as their earlier (preteen)
solutions had stopped working.
As one 13 year old boy gloomily remarked, "Tums out the people with the words
always win." Relationships had become an absorbing topic for boys as well.
Performances
At the end of the 8 week program, the teens performed to show off their
social leadership skills. At School A, they chose to put on a program of rap songs
for 4 of their teachers, and 3 guidance counselors. (Parents were invited but none
could attend, due to work commitments.) They also took art work and poetry home
to their parents. At School B, the teens chose to put on a program of songs and
skits. 10 parents attended, as did the principal and the seventh grade guidance
counselor.
Evaluation Results for Teen Groups
Evaluation results - Children
100% of the teen participants at both schools noted positive changes as a
result of the program 90% at School A responded with more willingness to help in
hypothetical situations after the program, as did 83% of those at School B.
Evaluation results - Adults
89% of the parents noted positive changes as a result of the program. So
did all school officials interviewed. School officials noted not just a change in the
children in the group, but an overall change in the social climate of the 7th grade.
None of the School A parents could attend their children's performance, but their
ratings were just as high as those School B parents who were able to attend.
Apparently, just hearing about the group and the performance at home was enough
to favorably impress School A parents, and help them notice change.
Themes
The most common theme noted by the children was an overall more
positive view of self. While both genders gave this response, more boys than girls
had responses in this category. Examples are:

Peace and Conflict Studies• Volume 13, Number 1
- 88 -

ignore its , ..,
is to come· ,
painful fo
An e.
children chm
(29). In the· 1
other little ··
painful to reaJ
tempting to sl
more touching
let your light
children enco
grandparents.

Rudolph the Haitian Reindeer and other Heroes

· al about the
erent type of
sed primarily
ciot seem like
1Ye a future."
1anage anger

genders, and
the findings.
1 seek out our
as the group
ts. We were
teens. They
:xcerpt. Boys
·lier (preteen)
ith the words
; well.
b.ow off their
of rap songs
ited but none
poetry home
of songs and
ade guidance

changes as a
,e ss to help in
LB.
program. So
change in the
the 7th grade.
nee, but their
,le to attend.
~ was enough

overall more
oys than girls

♦

"I am so much of a better person now. Not a mean person any more. "
(School A, boy, age 13)
"I change my act of being a bully. I am a better person than I was back then. It
have made a difference in my life of being a bully. "
(School B, boy, age 13)
Children also frequently noted having more options. While both genders gave this
response, more girls than boys had responses in this category. Examples of
responses placed in this category are:
"I know how to distract or walk away now. "
(School A, girl, age 13))
"DEFEND - I use it to remind myself of all the things I can do. "
(School B, girl, age 13))
The parents shared a more positive view of their child. Examples include:
"She
got
nicer"
(School
B,
parent)
"My child has changed a lot. Everyday when she come from school she say her day
was perfect specially because of what you people teach her. Sorry for the spelling
but I barely know English but this is a great thing. " (School A, parent)
"I did not know my son need this program but he did. I did not know he was going
to be a leader but he is. " (School A, parent)
School officials noted less anger and tension, and more willingness of teens to solve
their interpersonal problems without adult intervention being necessary. At both
locations, we were asked to return and to expand the program to all grades.
Training Outcomes
As our staff consisted primarily of master's level family therapy interns,
this was a training as well as a clinical and research program. As such, it was
challenging and intense. Validation of the client's reality is among the most
important skills a brief therapist can have (27). When working with children, such
validation can be difficult, as the temptation is there to "sugar coat" their reality or
ignore its painful aspects. To enter honestly into the reality of children's daily lives
is to come face to face with our culture's "savage inequalities"(28) in their most
painful form.
An example of this was the performance at the Boys and Girls Club. The
children chose to present a holiday skit based on Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer
(29). In their version, Rudolph was a recently arrived immigrant from Haiti, and the
other little "reindeer" taunted him with ugly racial and cultural epithets. It was
painful to realize the children had heard these epithets applied to themselves and
tempting to shut down the skit. Yet the children's brutal honesty made it all the
more touching when Santa appeared to admonish Rudolph to "walk with pride and
let your light shine", and when Rudolph ultimately won over his detractors. (The
children encored the skit 3 times to the thunderous applause of their parents and
grandparents.)
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Interns involved in this project worked with children directly in their own
daily contexts, and thus experienced firsthand the gap between the ideal world we
all wish for our children, and the world our children actually inhabit. We think this
was valuable experience. Interns reported increased multicultural awareness, a goal
of accredited training programs (30). And as their clinical supervisor, the first
author can attest that none of the interns or doctoral assistants involved with this
program are likely be among the 49.7 % of MFT's reportedly uncomfortable
involving children in therapy (31). We learned a great deal from our child clients
and their resilience in difficult situations.
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Limitations
There are so many variables that go into the complex life of children in
schools that we certainly cannot state that we had any impact on overall school
violence or total referrals for bullying. Ours was not the comprehensive program
needed for such sweeping goals (32). Our goals were more modest: simply to help
the children in our sample see themselves as helpful, nonviolent leaders, and be
seen that way by adults as well. We believe they will as a result act more like
positive leaders, living up to their newly positive reputations (33, 34). Large scale
meta analysis studies which support this assumption do exist (35), and we relied
upon them.
Nor were we able to fully address diversity issues. We wish we could have
had male MFT's as well as program leaders. And we were troubled by the large
percentage of children of color with whom we worked who seemed, initially, to
have negative views about themselves. While it is wonderful that the young man
who wrote "I am so much of a better person now" is now seeing himself in this
more positive way, we are saddened that he apparently previously thought he was
not such a good person. We would be naive to discount the effects of institutional
racism in such situations (36).
We are troubled also by the way so many adults initially saw the teens in
our sample as "angry". We did not see them this way, but rather as understandably
frustrated by perceiving a lack of options. However, this is not to say that anger is
not a perfectly appropriate response to inequities (37). The topic of adult
attributions about angry children is worthy of exploration in other studies.

Conclusions
Overall, we are pleased we went ahead with the program, even though it
could not be the comprehensive program we had originally planned. Even busy and
overburdened as they were, parents and school officials turned out to be very
willing to become positive audiences for change. Overall, 80% of the children in
our study see themselves as more positive leaders now than they did before we
came to visit their school or center - this statistic becomes 96 % if you leave out the
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4th and 5th grade boys, metaphorically sending them out to play as they would have
preferred. The program was most effective with preteen girls and young teens of
both genders, and appeared to be effective across cultural and ethnic lines. Most
gratifying .was the positive response of the initially skeptical parents, whose own
view of their children is always the most critically important (38). We are glad we
were able to help these children shine in their parent's eyes.
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